Laserfiche WebLink
�2 <br /> opment fee statutes have equity provisions gives to the city a downstream share of a option to use tax-exempt private activity <br /> between business and residential develop- project income flow and recovers the city's bonds as a tool for economic develop- <br /> ment which indirectly limit fee waivers in investment in the site. Others are those in ment, it will be because of abuses, typi- <br /> either area unless fully funded from a which the city or redevelopment agency tally involving assistance to develop- <br /> third source, such as an industrial devel- recovers in new revenues the cost of the ments that would have happened without <br /> opment authority, a redevelopment incentive plus a significant net gain for the the incentive. Not only the federal gov- <br /> agency, or the state. community in jobs and revenues. ernment but many state legislatures as <br /> Locally adopted investment policies or There is nothing wrong with a city well are reacting negatively and in some <br /> state statutes adopted since the Orange making a good investment. The challenge cases punitively in response to the per- <br /> County bankruptcy may further limit the often is to have the courage to ask for ception that many incentive transactions <br /> use of public funds for incentives. Finance something in return for an incentive. Most are a waste of tax resources and do not <br /> directors and city attorneys need to be entrepreneurs do not react unkindly to an achieve a public purpose. The role of <br /> involved in incentive negotiations to entrepreneurial approach by the city. finance officials is to make sure every <br /> assure their legality. incentive can be defended. <br /> What Is an Undesirable Incentive? <br /> What Is a Desirable Incentive? First, undesirable incentives are those Conclusion <br /> In the broadest possible terms, a desir- that look bad to the public. They can create The pressures associated with eco- <br /> able incentive is one that is financially the appearance of unequal treatment of nomic development are substantial. <br /> profitable to the city and its redevelop- similar businesses under similar circum- Frequently the elected official is invited <br /> ment or industrial development agency stances. Secondly, they also can be activities to the negotiating table before the finance <br /> and produces jobs. Profit can be defined in that cause or offer the potential for litiga- director is. Jobs sometimes can take <br /> this case as net revenues from the project tion, such as a developer fee rebate or sales priority over balancing the city budget. <br /> exceeding the cost of incentives plus tax exemption. Thirdly, an incentive is The challenge to the finance director is to <br /> recurring costs of providing municipal unwarranted when the recipient would pre-educate the city council, then ensure <br /> services. Another criterion for a desirable have come to the community regardless of that he/she is at the table. This calls for <br /> incentive is that it does not immediately the incentive. Lastly, an incentive is not a horse sense and close consultation with <br /> create a charge of unequal treatment of positive one if it is likely to cause a future the city attorney. The approach to incAft <br /> businesses in similar circumstances. Lastly, budget or cash-flow problem for the city. tives should be entrepreneurial: the ci <br /> a desirable incentive should be one that No finance director should be bashful seeking to make money. While portraying <br /> causes an investment or relocation that when it comes to preparing a confidential a pro-business attitude, dollars on the <br /> would not have otherwise happened. report for the city manager or legislative table for the city is by far the most <br /> In determining whether an incentive is a body 1) indemnifying specific cases or important approach to successful incen- <br /> positive one or not, a finance director prospective cases where there could be the tive negotiations. ❑ <br /> should be prepared to produce a dis- charge that unequal treatment was pro- <br /> counted proforma indicating the public vided, 2) analyzing the financial ramifica- KURT H.AHN,nne»nber of GFOA's Committee on <br /> investments and tax or utility revenues tions if similar incentives were provided Retirement and Benefits Administration,has been the <br /> financial and economic services director of the City of <br /> generated to determine the payback period generally, and 3) pointing out potentials for Healdsburg,California,since 1977,serving as finance <br /> and compare current values of each. The litigation based on gifts of public funds. If, director and redevelopment director.A past president <br /> public investments should include not only in the view of the finance officer, a business of the California Society of Municipal Finance <br /> incentives but recurring costs to provide will come to the city absent incentives or if Officers and six-year nnennber of the board of <br /> directors of the California Association for Local <br /> services including, if applicable, utility future budgets will be adversely affected, Econo»nic Development,be chairs the Economic <br /> services. the finance officer should so advise the city Development Policy Subcommittee of the League of <br /> Sound incentives can be secured loans manager loudly and clearly. California Cities and was the principal author of The <br /> to developers in which the city is assured Undesirable incentives take many forms, Economic Development Handbook published by the <br /> of full repayment with interest equal to or but the most typical is one in which virtu- California League of Cities. <br /> above the rate of the city's investment ally all new revenues generated by a project <br /> pool. Many cities will finance utility- are returned to the developer, which has <br /> related infrastructure or developer/capac- been the case in a variety of "big box" <br /> ity fees and add loan payments to utility transactions. Another case is the use of <br /> bills. Another example is a grant/loan that incentives in bidding wars to relocate an <br /> positions the city as an equity partner in existing business, in some cases from a <br /> the development and provides for loan nearby municipality. Still other examples <br /> repayment with interest and/or participa- are a grant or loan to business which <br /> tion in the income flow of the develop- would have come to the town without an <br /> ment. Typically used in many UDAG incentive, a retroactive incentive, or a tax <br /> projects, this approach is increasingly rebate incentive to every business in town <br /> employed when local incentives are sought just to create the image of a business- <br /> by the developer. Similarly, a positive friendly locality. • <br /> incentive can be a land sale or lease that If cities should eventually be denied the <br /> 32 JUNE 1996•GOVERNMENT FINANCE REVIEW <br />