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<br />. <br /> <br />fo,&v <br /># <br />IV <br />~~ <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />The Policy Governance@ Model <br /> <br />Page 12 of 16 <br /> <br />advice to staff. But advice. if it is really advice, can be rejected. If staff has any doubt that advice <br />given by the board or one of its components cannot safely be turned down, the clarity of board-to- <br />staff delegation will be undermined. Policy Governance boards refrain from giving advice or allowing <br />their members to give advice unless advice is requested. This protects the board's ability to hold the <br />CEO accountable for his or her own decisions. The CEO and any of the staff can request advice if <br />they need it. and they can request it from wherever Ihey wish. <br /> <br />Traditional boards frequently create committees to assist or advise the CEO or staff, such as <br />committees on personnel, finance, program, properly maintenance, and other such staff means <br />issues. In Policy Governance, such committees are illegitimate. They constitute interference in the <br />CEO's sphere of authority and accountability. and damage the board's ability to hold the CEO <br />accountable. <br /> <br />If. for example, the staff wishes to have an advisory committee, it is perfectly free to create one. then <br />to use the advice or not as it deems wise. If, however, the board controls the mechanism of advice, <br />a very different relationship between advisors and advisees is established. The wisest route is for <br />the board to govern and leave advice and advisory mechanisms to the staff's own initiative. This <br />way the staff gets all the advice it needs, role clarity and accountability are maintained, and board <br />members are frequently spared unnecessary work. <br /> <br />Policy Governance boards use committees only to help the board to do its own job. Hence, a <br />committee which explores methods of ownership consultation about ~ options is legitimate, as is <br />a 90mmittee that~s possible sources offiscal jeopardy that the board might address in an <br />Executive LimitCltinns pnliry But a human resources committee that advises on or intervenes in <br />- personnel iss"is not. To request advice or assistance with one's own job is acceptable and does <br />not compromise accountability. but to foist help or advice on subordinates is not only unnecessary <br />but destructive of accountability as well. <br /> <br />Policy Governance takes seriously the normally rhetorical assertion that boards be visionary and <br />provide long term leadership. The discipline required for this challenge cannot be overstated. In fact. <br />Policy Governance has been criticized as a "heroic board" model that is romantically idealistic! Yet <br />boards do. in fact, have a critical job to do; no amount of helping staff can substitute for getting its <br />own job done. Boards.llll.lli!. oersevere. with the arduous, complex task of iescribinQ ouroose and <br />ethics/orudence boundaries. Forming those values into clear policies is far harder than telling the <br />staff how to do its job. SpeakinQ oroactivelv for the ownershio requires stronQ commitmi>nt nnt In <br />take reactive refuge in rituals. reports, and approvals. <br /> <br />This requires board member expertise relevant to governance. not management. Board members <br />should no longer be recruited based on their having skills that mirror the skills of staff. Governance <br />excellence requires members who can think conceptually and with a long term perspective, able to <br />welcome a diversity of opinions but abide by group decisions. They must be able to speak on behalf <br />. of the ownershio rather than merelv from their own or some splinter Qroup oersDeetive. They must <br />place organizational accountability above personal gratification. They must be able to view the <br />board's task of assuring performance at arm's length-through setting expectations (using the <br />ends/means principle and values viewed as descending "bowls"), delegating pointedly (to a CEO if <br />possible). and monitoring. And it is to the function of monitoring or evaluation that we turn now. <br /> <br />Evaluation <br /> <br />Evaluation of performance is not extraneous to the board's job. It is as integral to the board's job as <br />it is to any manager's. But, as we have shown, proper evaluation is impossible unless the board has <br />first stated its expectations and assigned them to a specific delegatee. That is, evaluation of staff <br />performance cannot occur appropriately unless the board has done its job first. <br /> <br />Moreover. if the board has a CEO, the results of proper evaluation of organizational success is the <br />only fair evaluation of CEO performance. Since the CEO's job is to see to it that the organization <br /> <br />http://www.carvergovernance.com/model.htm <br /> <br />6/] 2/2002 <br />