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<br />e <br /> <br />3 <br />4 <br />5 <br /> <br />6 <br />7 <br />8 <br />9 <br />10 <br />11 <br />12 <br />13 <br />14 <br />15 <br />16 <br />17 <br />18 <br />19 <br />20 <br />21 <br /> <br />t <br /> <br />25 <br />26 <br />27 <br />28 <br />29 <br /> <br />30 <br />31 <br />32 <br />33 <br />34 <br />35 <br />36 <br />37 <br />38 <br />39 <br />40 <br />41 <br />42 <br />43 <br /> <br />e <br />46 <br />47 <br /> <br />As the electric market is opened to interstate competition, the federal government <br />must preserve the application of Minnesota's state and local sales taxes to the sale of <br />electricity, regardless of the place of origin. <br /> <br />Stranded Cost Recovery <br /> <br />Issue: Regulated utilities have traditionally made operating decisions based on needs of <br />consumers within their service territories. Many decisions, therefore, have been based more on <br />need than on economics. In the transition from a regulated to a restructured competitive <br />environment, electric generators' investments in fixed assets and other obligations mayor may <br />not remain as economically viable. Estimates of these "stnmded costs" vary greatly, with some <br />indicating no stranded costs or possibly even negative stranded costs resulting from increased <br />prices after deregulation in Minnesota. <br /> <br />Response: If regulatory actions have contributed to investment by existing regulated <br />utilities that are not economically viable in a competitive market, and if restructuring <br />occurs, the League supports transition mechanisms that will allow utilities to collect <br />revenues for those particular stranded costs. However, these charges must be carefully <br />monitored to ensure that only eligible and verifiable costs are covered and that over- <br />collections do not occur. Taxpayers and ratepayers should not be expected to cover the cost <br />of investments that were made for business reasons, apart from the requirement to serve <br />under the regulated system. <br /> <br />If negative stranded costs for the regulated utility as a whole can be established, and <br />are solely the result of transition to a restructured environment, these regulated utilities <br />should be required to contribute some limited percentage of established amounts to offset <br />tax breaks given to these utilities as a result of restructuring. <br /> <br />Property Tax <br /> <br />Issue: Part of the discussion regarding possible deregulation of the electric power <br />industry has centered on electric utility taxation. Proponents of restructuring assert that if <br />effective free market competition is to replace governmental regulation, state tax policy must be <br />changed. The main focus of the investor owned utilities (IOUs) so far has been removal of the <br />attached machinery or personal property tax. Utilities subject to the tax argue it places them at a <br />competitive disadvantage to non-Minnesota companies, rural electric cooperatives (co-ops), and <br />municipals. However, accurate comparisons of tax burden are difficult, as other states use <br />completely different taxing systems. Municipals make substantial payments-in-lieu of taxes. <br />Additionally, co-ops and municipals do pay direct taxes on some of their property and indirectly <br />when they purchase wholesale power from sources that are taxed, such as IOUs. <br /> <br />Utility personal property can be a significant portion of the local tax base in all cities. <br />Most obviously affected are cities that have power plants; however, transmission and distribution <br />equipment account for over half of the personal property taxes paid by the IOUs and exist in <br />nearly every city. Replacing the revenue that would be lost to cities, counties, school districts, <br />and other local taxing jurisdictions is a stated goal of the IOUs; however, the mechanics and <br />funding sources of such a replacement revenue would be difficult to develop and administer and <br /> <br />41 <br />