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<br />Robert H. Lynn <br />April 15, 2008 <br />Page 14 <br /> <br />Haumant v. Griffin, 699 N.W.2d 774,778 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Mangold, 274 Minn. at <br />358,143 N.W.2d at 820). <br /> <br />The subject matter of the regulations - billboards - has long been regulated at the local <br />level and Plaintiffs arguments to the contrary have been rejected by the courts. As the Hennepin <br />County District Court concluded in Clear Channel Outdoor v. City of Minnetonka, when <br />rejecting Clear Channel's pre-emption claim, the authority of Minnesota cities to independently <br />regulate signs is longstanding and well-established. Clear Channel Outdoor v. City of <br />Minnetonka, Hennepin County District Court, Case No. 27-CV-06-23485, Order Denying <br />Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction (attached hereto as Exhibit D), at 18 (citing <br />Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. of Minn. v. Village of Minnetonka, 281 Minn. 492, 162 <br />N.W.2d 206 (1968) (affirming Minnetonka's implied statutory authority to drive new and old <br />billboards out of its residentially-zoned areas - including areas where the federal and state <br />billboard-control statutes declined to reach). Similarly, when Clear Channel's predecessor, Eller <br />Media, asserted that the authority of Minnesota cities to independently regulate signs was <br />preempted, the district court rejected this argument and held that Section 173.10 "specifically <br />pennits municipalities, by ordinance or otherwise, to enact more restrictive provisions <br />concerning advertising devices." Eller Media Co. v. City of St. Paul, Ramsey County District <br />Court, Case No. C7-01-8400, Order granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment and <br />denying Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (J. Bjorkman) (holding that Section 173.10 <br />"specifically permits municipalities, by ordinance or otherwise, to enact more restrictive <br />provisions conceming advertising devices."). See also City of COllage Grove v. 0/1,395 N.W.2d <br />111, 113-115 (Minn. Ct App. 1986); Advantage Media LLC, 456 F.3d at 802-03; Arcadia <br />Development Corp. v. City of Bloomington, 267 Minn. 221, 227,125 N.W.2d 846,851 (1964). <br /> <br />The subject matter has certainly not "become solely a matter of state concern;" indeed, <br />the state statute not only explicitly reserves the right of local governments to more restrictively <br />regulate advertising, but provides that "pennit systems ofIegitimate local zoning authorities shall <br />take precedence inside a business area." Minn. Stat. !l 173.13, subd. I. In rejecting Clear <br />Channel's pre-emption claim, the Hennepin County District Court also observed that both Minn. <br />Stat. !l173.1 0 and !l173.20 provided that nothing in state law "shall be construed to abrogate, or <br />affect the provisions of any other law, municipal ordinance, regulation, or resolution which is <br />more restrictive than are the provisions. . . [of state statutes]." Clear Channel Outdoor, Order <br />Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Exhibit D, at J 8. The Court based this <br />holding, in part, on the express provisions in Chapter 173 mentioned above which recognized the <br />power of municipalities to impose regulations more restrictive than state law. Id. at 18-20. In <br />fact, even the MNDOT application form for an "advertising device permit" states that the permit <br />is "Subject to Local Ordinace [sic]." These factors should be fatal to any pre-emption claim. See <br />Roucheleau, 686 N.W.2d at 890. <br /> <br />There is no "partial legislation on the subject matter evincing an intent to treat the subject <br />matter as solely a state concem." The Hennepin County District Court explained that "Clear <br /> <br />