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<br />'~; <br /> <br /> <br />Robert H. Lynn <br />April 15,200& <br />Page 16 <br /> <br />face mean that the City was impliedly granting permission to Plaintiff to install the LED sign <br />face. To the contrary, as soon as the LED sign became operational and the City realized what <br />Plaintiff had done, it directed Plaintiff to cease and desist operation of the unJawful sign. <br /> <br />Not only do the facts belie Plaintiffs estoppel and waiver claims, but the Minnesota <br />courts have repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that "a governmental entity' cannot be estopped <br />from correctly enforcing the ordinance even if the property owner relied to his detriment on prior <br />city action.'" SLS Partnership v. City of Apple Valley, 511 N.W.2d 738, 743 (Minn. 1994) <br />(quoting Nursery Sales, Inc. v. City of RoseviIle, 295 N.W.2d 604, 607 (Minn. 1980)). In SLS <br />Partnership, the Minnesota Supreme Court refused to estop a city from enforcing a setback <br />requirement, even where it tried to do so for the first time after 24 years of issuing annual <br />permits despite ongoing setback violations. See id. at 740. See a/so John Wright & Assocs. v. <br />City of Red Wing, 254 Minn. 1, &,93 N.W.2d 660, 664-65 (1958) (illegal use of a building since <br />its inception does not become legal simply by the passage of time); Prior Lalre Aggregates v. <br />City of Savage, 349 N.W.2d 575, 5&0 (Minn. Ct. App. J9&4) (holding that a municipality could <br />not be estopped from enforcing its zoning ordinances); 8A Eugene McQuillan, THE LAW OF <br />MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS;) 25.349 (3d ed. 1994) (it is no defense to an injunctive suit that <br />municipal authorities have done nothing about the alleged violation). The Minnesota Supreme <br />Court has done nothing to erode the continued validity of its articulation of the governing <br />standard in SLS Partnership. Accordingly, Plaintiff has no legal basis for claiming that the <br />City's actions with respect to the electrical pennit or inactions with respect to prior sign <br />alterations by Clear Channel somehow permit Plaintiff to illegally operate the LED sign. <br /> <br />4. The City Did Not Fail to Review the Sign Permit Within the Allotted Time <br /> <br />Although Plaintiff fails to raise this claim in its Complaint, and never raised it on appeal <br />to the Council, it is anticipated that Plaintiff will contend that its sign permit application must be <br />"deemed approved" because the City allegedly failed to approve or review the sign permit <br />application within 30 days from receipt of the application. Section 1220.03 of the City's Sign <br />Code provides that <br /> <br />The City Administrator or their designee shall approve or deny the sign permit <br />application in an expedited manner, no more than thirty (30) days from the receipt <br />of the completed application, including applicable fees. All permits not reviewed <br />within thirty (30) days shall be deemed approved. Applicants shall be notified in <br />writing if the application is denied, including the reasons for denial. <br /> <br />Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that Plaintiff "submitted a sign pennit application to the <br />City on May 21,2007" and denied the application on June 18,2007. The copy of the sign permit <br />application in the possession of the City is stamped with the date of May 21, 2007, indicating <br />that the City received the application on May 21, 2007. The copy ofthe sign permit application <br />in the possession of the City attorney is stamped with the date of May 21, 2007. However, the <br />copy of the sign permit application in the possession of Clear Channel and produced for the first <br />