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Robert H. Lynn April 15,2008 Page 8 Roseville, 295 N. W.2d 604, 608-09 (Minn. 1980), and the intention of zoning laws regarding nonconforming structures is to increase the likelihood that nonconformities "will in time be eliminated due to obsolescence, exhaustion, Or destruction" and to "lead to a uniform use of the land consistent with the overall comprehensive zoning plan." County of Freeborn, 295 Minn. at 99, 203 N.W.2d at 325. Allowing a nonconforming use or structure to be expanded in this fashion violates this policy because it decreases the likelihood that nonconforming structures will be replaced by conforming structures in the ordinary course of their use. Id, 295 Minn. at 100, 203 N. W .3d at 326 (finding that "construction of a building where none existed before constitutes an expansion" in part because "the building will prolong the continuation of the nonconformiug use and considerably lessen the likelihood that it will be eliminated in the foreseeable future."). Plaintiff has admittedly increased the size of its billboard. It has admittedly done so for the purpose of employing LED technology to "remain competitive" in the outdoor advertising industry. The purpose and spirit of the City's zoning ordinance would be defeated if Plaintiff could extend or prolong indefinitely the life of its nonconforming billboard through an expansion. See County of Lake, 451 N.W.2d at 341 (stating that County's interpretation of its zoning ordinance advanced the underlying purpose of regulating existing nonconformities and that the other party's interpretation wouJd thwart the intended goal of the zoning ordinance and the County's power to eliminate nonconformities). For all these reasons, the City is entitled to the removal of the LED sign face and restoration of the standard sign face. B. Plaintiffs' Switch from External to Non-External lIIuminlltion Violates the City's Sign Code Plaintiff s installation of the LED device rendered the sign unlawful in a new respect. In a district in which the only form of lighting allowed is external illumination, Plaintiff replaced an externally illuminated sign face with one that is not externally illuminated, thus creating a new violation of the City's Sign Code. Section 1240.02, Table 1, of the Sign Code permits only extemal lighting for signs located in Sign District 7, and Section 1210.01, subd. 6, defines extemal lighting as illumination "by means of external light fixtures directed at the sign." The static sign was illuminated by four external light fixtures located outside the sign face directed at the sign face. By contrast, the LED sign relies solely upon thousands of LEDs generating light On the surface of the sign itself. Plaintiff insists that its sign meets the City's lighting standards by first contending that the relevant standard is not whether the lighting on the sign is external, but whether the sign is an <'illuminated sign" within the meaning of Section 1210.01, subd. 18. The definition of an illuminated sign is <'any sign, which has characters, letters, figures, designs or outlines which is illuminated by an artificial light source." Plaintiff claims that its LED sign "has no characters, letters, figures, designs or outlines which are illuminated by an artificial light source." Plaintiff never explains, however, why it is justifiable to ignore the plain wording of the Sign Code that allows only extemal lighting of signs located in District 7, and defines that phrase. (In any event,