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<br />Table 5. Simulation Results for Different Tax Increment District (TID) Certification limits <br /> <br /> <br />that lnay have a sm.all chance of finan- <br />cial reward. <br />Third, even if a TIF project produces <br />net financial gains in the long run, in <br />the near term TIF will likely cause nega- <br />tive financial effects. Although projects <br />with positive expected net present <br />values should be implenlented, a policy <br />of widespread use of TIF may be unsus- <br />tainable from a financial standpoint. <br />The ultiInate question for elected local <br />officials is whether 'TIF proj ects expected <br />to have long-term positive financial <br />effects can be impleInented in the face <br />of other short-term budget dem.ands. <br />Those seeking to justify the use of TIF <br />on the basis of nonfinancial rewards <br />should be prepared to address how these <br />rewards might offset the financial losses <br />froIn the use of the particular incentive. <br />Finally, we can now say a bit more <br />about those circumstances that will lead <br />to a profitable project from the local <br />government's perspective. These circum- <br />stances include low probability of devel- <br />oplnent without TIF and a short <br />certification period. <br />As this study demonstrates, local <br />governments face significant financial <br />risks when they inlplement TIF projects, <br />but that they can potentially reap finan- <br />cial rewards. Currently TIF is an open <br />policy option for conlmunity and <br />economic developnlent in most states, <br />and it will likely remain so for many <br />years to come. However, much further <br />research is necessary to provide context <br />on the decision to use TIF. <br /> <br />Epilogue: Is There a Future for TIF in <br />Minnesota? <br />During the 2001 legislative session (after <br />the bulk of the research for this article <br />was complete), the Minnesota State <br />Legislature proposed and the governor <br />signed a bill changing the way that <br />primary education is funded in the state. <br />The principal effect of the bill was to <br />"remove" the basic general education <br />levy from the local government property <br />tax. An unintended consequence of this <br />change was to relllove one significant <br />financial participant from tax increment <br />distlicts (before the changes, school <br />district levies constituted an average 340/0 <br />of the local property tax levy). <br />Many observers have speculated that <br />this change has struck the death knell <br />for TIF in Minnesota. Previously, cities <br />and counties wanting to use TIF shared <br />the burden of financing TIF with school <br />districts, each providing about one-third <br />of the financial value. Now with the <br />majority of school district finances <br />conling from sources other than the <br />local property tax, cities and counties <br />will have to participate with nearly all <br />of the necessary revenues for the <br />project. Other economic development <br />tools-such as the property tax <br />abatement incentive authorized by the <br />Minnesota legislature in 1997 <br />(Minnesota Statutes 2001, ~469.1813) <br />-may be more attractive for local <br />governments. <br />Education finance reform may well <br />have struck a blow to the use of TIF in <br /> <br />Minnesota, but there are at least a <br />couple of ways that local governments <br />can still employ TIE First, a local <br />government could simply enlarge the <br />district that uses the financing tool. A <br />district with a larger geographic area <br />would allow a jurisdiction to capture <br />more resources to use for the project. <br />Second, although property taxes are <br />currently the only authorized source of <br />tax increment funding in Minnesota, it <br />is neither inconceivable nor unprece- <br />dented for local governments to use <br />other tax increments to finance <br />econom.ic redevelopment.4 For the <br />moment, TIF in Minnesota lllay not be <br />dead, but only in hiatus. <br /> <br />Kenneth A. Kriz is assistant professor of <br />public finance at the School of Public <br />Administration, University of Nebraska at <br />Omaha. He was assistant professor of <br />public and nonprofit management at the <br />Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public <br />Affairs at the time the research for this <br />article was undertaken. His current <br />research focuses on municipal debt <br />management, economic development <br />policy, and transportation finance, along <br />with the use of alternative estimation <br />techniques in public finance. He teaches <br />courses in public sector economics, public <br />finance, and statistical analysis. <br />The research upon which this article is <br />based was supported in part through a <br />New Initiative grant from CURA. These <br />grants support projects that are initiated <br />by faculty, community organizations, <br />government agencies, or students and <br />that are not appropriate for consideration <br />under another CURA program. For full <br />results of this research project, see <br />Kenneth A. Kriz, "The Effect of Tax Incre- <br />ment Finance on local Government Finan- <br />cial Condition." Municipal Finance Journal <br />22 (2001): 41-64. <br /> <br />4 For a review of other tax increment prograrns, see <br />John L.Mikesell, uNonproperty Tax Increlnent <br />Progranls for Econonlic Developrnent: A Review of <br />the Alternative Programs." In Tax Increment <br />Financing and Economic Development: Uses, Stnlctures, <br />and l1npact. Craig L. Johnson and Joyce Y. Man, eds. <br />Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2001. <br /> <br />SUMMER 2003 7 <br />