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qualified when its application would contravene overriding public policy); see also <br /> Falgren v. State Bd. of Teaching, 545 N.W.2d 901, 905 (Minn. 1996) (noting that <br /> "collateral estoppel is not rigidly applied" and stating that "[a]s a flexible doctrine, the <br /> focus is on whether its application would work an injustice on the party against whom <br /> estoppel is urged" (quoting Johnson v. Consol. Freightways, Ins., 420 N.W.2d 608, 613- <br /> 14 (Minn. 1988) (quotation marks omitted)). <br /> Second, there is a significant difference in the character of the property involved in <br /> these two proceedings. We acknowledge that the district court received evidence of the <br /> 2006 condemnation award in the context of Schwab's appraisal. But the district court <br /> was not bound to determine the special benefit of the current project based solely on that <br /> award, which involved a portion of Sheehy's property that consisted mostly of wetlands. <br /> We therefore decline to consider the city's collateral - estoppel argument based on Thiele. <br /> Substantively, the city argues that the district court abused its discretion by <br /> admitting Shopek's testimony because that testimony failed to meet the evidentiary <br /> foundational requirements to admit evidence based on the "development -cost approach" <br /> to market value as articulated in Buzick v. City of Blaine, 491 N.W.2d 923 (Minn. App. <br /> 1992), affd, 505 N.W.2d 51 (Minn. 1993).' Specifically, Buzick requires that before the <br /> 1 The supreme court has recognized that, in certain circumstances, in determining the <br /> value of a special benefit conferred on assessed property, courts may consider property <br /> appraisals based on a development -cost approach. Cnty. of Ramsey v. Miller, 316 <br /> N.W.2d 917, 919 -20 (Minn. 1982). Such an approach "is designed to reflect, through <br /> cash flow analysis, the current price a developer - purchaser would be warranted in paying <br /> for the land, given the cost of developing it and the probable proceeds from the sale of <br /> developed sites." Id. at 920. We have previously affirmed the district court's exclusion <br /> of evidence on the development -cost approach for lack of foundation, when calculations <br /> 8 <br /> 21 <br />