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court exercises a clearly- erroneous standard of review. Id. at 203. But if the issue <br /> presented is whether an assessment exceeds the special benefit to that property, so as to <br /> determine whether an unconstitutional taking has occurred, the district court's "[d]ecision <br /> must be based upon independent consideration of all the evidence." Id. <br /> An assessment is presumed to be legally valid, and evidence of an assessment roll <br /> constitutes "prima facie proof that the assessment does not exceed special benefit." <br /> Carlson -Lang, 307 Minn. at 370, 240 N.W.2d at 519. Appealing parties can overcome <br /> this presumption by introducing competent evidence that the assessment is greater than <br /> the benefit. Id.; McNally, 686 N.W.2d at 559. Once the presumption is rebutted by <br /> introducing adverse evidence on the question of value, the district court weighs <br /> conflicting evidence on the value of the benefit conferred. Buettner, 277 N.W.2d at 204; <br /> see In re Meyer, 176 Minn. 240, 243, 223 N.W. 135, 136 (1929) (stating that evidence to <br /> rebut the presumption of validity "raises an issue of fact upon which normally the <br /> decision of the trier of fact will be final "). <br /> The city initially argues that, to the extent that Herman's appraisal relied on <br /> Shopek's testimony, Sheehy's assessment appeal challenged the city's project — design <br /> decision, a legislative function, so that the district court should have examined the city's <br /> assessment decision under a clearly- erroneous standard, rather than making an <br /> independent consideration of all the evidence. We disagree. Although Sheehy raised <br /> various arguments, including a challenge to the apportionment of benefits, the main thrust <br /> of Sheehy's argument was that the assessment exceeded the special benefit to the <br /> property. See In re Vill. of Burnsville Assessments, 287 N.W.2d 375, 376 -77 (Minn. <br /> 11 <br /> 24 <br />