|
<br />2006 LEGISLATIVE SESSION, continlled
<br />that insurance waives the limits of governmental liability.
<br />The tort liability limits are waived to the extent that
<br />collectible insurance exceeds the tort liability limits.
<br />
<br />Increases to the TOrt Liability Caps
<br />
<br />In addition to clarifying the liability of joint
<br />powers entities, the Legislature phased in increases to
<br />the tort liability caps themselves. The limits had not
<br />been increased for ten years. Currently, the liability
<br />cap is statutorily set at $300,000 per individual claim
<br />and to $1,000,000 for all claims arising out of a single
<br />occurrence.
<br />Under the new law, the cap per individual claim will
<br />increase to $400,000 and the cap for all claims arising
<br />out of a single occurrence to $1,200,000. The increase
<br />will be effective for claims arising on or after January 1,
<br />2008, but before July 1,2009. These caps will increase
<br />again on July 1, 2009 to the limits of $500,000 and
<br />$1,500,000 respectively.
<br />The delayed implementation to January 1, 2008,
<br />and the staggered increase in the tort liability caps will
<br />allow government entities covered by these caps to
<br />increase their insurance coverage gradually up to the
<br />new stanltory amounts. Municipalities will want to
<br />review their insurance coverage and increase as necessary
<br />in accordance with the effective dates. A municipality
<br />that fails to have insurance meeting these statutory caps
<br />on their effective dates could expose itself to additional
<br />out-of-pocket costs in the event of a successful lawsuit.
<br />Notwithstanding this, municipalities should keep in
<br />mind that procuring additional insurance coverage prior
<br />to the effective dates could expand its liability to the
<br />limits of the increased coverage.
<br />
<br />FIRST AMENDMENT, continlled
<br />In Pickering a teacher wrote a letter to a local newspaper
<br />regarding funding policies of the school district. The Court
<br />analyzed that case under a two-parr inquiry: 1) whether the
<br />employee was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public
<br />concern; and 2) if so, did the speech adversely impact the
<br />governmental entity's operation. The Pickering Court
<br />concluded that the teacher had been speaking as a citizen
<br />on a matter of public concern in writing the letter, therefore
<br />implicating First Amendment protections.
<br />While recognizing rhat public employees have the
<br />right to protection when speaking as citizens on matters
<br />of public concern, the Court found that the controlling
<br />factor was that Ceballos wrote his memo pursuant to the
<br />duties of his position as a prosecutor. The Court held
<br />that when public employees make statements pursuant
<br />to their official duties they are not speaking as citizens for
<br />
<br />First Amendment purposes and the Constitution does
<br />not insulate them from discipline by their employers.
<br />Ceballos was being paid to perform work and was
<br />acting as a government employee when he engaged in
<br />the conduct in question. His supervisors had the right
<br />to evaluate his performance of those duties, even if those
<br />duties required him to express opinions. "Supervisors
<br />must ensure that their employees' official communications
<br />are accurate and, demonstrate sound judgment and
<br />promote the employer's mission." Ceballos. Thus, when
<br />the employee's actions are inflammatory or misguided,
<br />the employer has the authority to take corrective action
<br />without the First Amendment being implicated. The
<br />Court contrasted this holding from Pickering where the
<br />employee's speech was not in the course of the employee's
<br />official duties and bore no official significance.
<br />The Supreme Court went on to note, however, that
<br />formal job descriptions often bear little resemblance
<br />to the duties an employee actually performs and that
<br />therefore, employers may not restrict an employee's First
<br />Amendment rights by drafting excessively broad job
<br />descriptions. The inquiry will rest on what duties the
<br />employee actually performs in determining whether First
<br />Amendment protections attach.
<br />
<br />Whistleblower Protections Still In Effect
<br />
<br />Despite the holding in Ceballos, the Minnesota
<br />Whistleblower Act, Minnesota Statutes Section 181.932
<br />still protects employees, including public employees,
<br />who speak out regarding certain matters occurring in
<br />the workplace. In fact, Justice Kennedy, writing for the
<br />majority in Ceballos, specifically recognized the existence
<br />of whistleblower statutes as a course of action available to
<br />those seeking to expose governmental wrongdoing.
<br />The Minnesota WhisdebluwCLAc[prohibits an
<br />employer from discharging, disciplining, threatening,
<br />otherwise discriminating against, or penalizing an
<br />employee regarding the employee's compensation,
<br />terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employment
<br />because:
<br />(a) the employee, or a person acting on behalf of an
<br />employee, in good faith, reports a violation or
<br />suspected violation of any federal or state law or
<br />rule adopted pursuant to law to an employer or
<br />to any governmental body or law enforcement
<br />official;
<br />(b) the employee is requested by a public body or
<br />office to participate in an investigation, hearing,
<br />mqUlry;
<br />(c) the employee refuses an employer's order to perform
<br />an action that the employee has an objective basis
<br />in fact to believe violates any state or federal law
<br />contillued 011 page 4
<br />
<br />3
<br />
|