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<br />2006 LEGISLATIVE SESSION, continlled <br />that insurance waives the limits of governmental liability. <br />The tort liability limits are waived to the extent that <br />collectible insurance exceeds the tort liability limits. <br /> <br />Increases to the TOrt Liability Caps <br /> <br />In addition to clarifying the liability of joint <br />powers entities, the Legislature phased in increases to <br />the tort liability caps themselves. The limits had not <br />been increased for ten years. Currently, the liability <br />cap is statutorily set at $300,000 per individual claim <br />and to $1,000,000 for all claims arising out of a single <br />occurrence. <br />Under the new law, the cap per individual claim will <br />increase to $400,000 and the cap for all claims arising <br />out of a single occurrence to $1,200,000. The increase <br />will be effective for claims arising on or after January 1, <br />2008, but before July 1,2009. These caps will increase <br />again on July 1, 2009 to the limits of $500,000 and <br />$1,500,000 respectively. <br />The delayed implementation to January 1, 2008, <br />and the staggered increase in the tort liability caps will <br />allow government entities covered by these caps to <br />increase their insurance coverage gradually up to the <br />new stanltory amounts. Municipalities will want to <br />review their insurance coverage and increase as necessary <br />in accordance with the effective dates. A municipality <br />that fails to have insurance meeting these statutory caps <br />on their effective dates could expose itself to additional <br />out-of-pocket costs in the event of a successful lawsuit. <br />Notwithstanding this, municipalities should keep in <br />mind that procuring additional insurance coverage prior <br />to the effective dates could expand its liability to the <br />limits of the increased coverage. <br /> <br />FIRST AMENDMENT, continlled <br />In Pickering a teacher wrote a letter to a local newspaper <br />regarding funding policies of the school district. The Court <br />analyzed that case under a two-parr inquiry: 1) whether the <br />employee was speaking as a citizen on a matter of public <br />concern; and 2) if so, did the speech adversely impact the <br />governmental entity's operation. The Pickering Court <br />concluded that the teacher had been speaking as a citizen <br />on a matter of public concern in writing the letter, therefore <br />implicating First Amendment protections. <br />While recognizing rhat public employees have the <br />right to protection when speaking as citizens on matters <br />of public concern, the Court found that the controlling <br />factor was that Ceballos wrote his memo pursuant to the <br />duties of his position as a prosecutor. The Court held <br />that when public employees make statements pursuant <br />to their official duties they are not speaking as citizens for <br /> <br />First Amendment purposes and the Constitution does <br />not insulate them from discipline by their employers. <br />Ceballos was being paid to perform work and was <br />acting as a government employee when he engaged in <br />the conduct in question. His supervisors had the right <br />to evaluate his performance of those duties, even if those <br />duties required him to express opinions. "Supervisors <br />must ensure that their employees' official communications <br />are accurate and, demonstrate sound judgment and <br />promote the employer's mission." Ceballos. Thus, when <br />the employee's actions are inflammatory or misguided, <br />the employer has the authority to take corrective action <br />without the First Amendment being implicated. The <br />Court contrasted this holding from Pickering where the <br />employee's speech was not in the course of the employee's <br />official duties and bore no official significance. <br />The Supreme Court went on to note, however, that <br />formal job descriptions often bear little resemblance <br />to the duties an employee actually performs and that <br />therefore, employers may not restrict an employee's First <br />Amendment rights by drafting excessively broad job <br />descriptions. The inquiry will rest on what duties the <br />employee actually performs in determining whether First <br />Amendment protections attach. <br /> <br />Whistleblower Protections Still In Effect <br /> <br />Despite the holding in Ceballos, the Minnesota <br />Whistleblower Act, Minnesota Statutes Section 181.932 <br />still protects employees, including public employees, <br />who speak out regarding certain matters occurring in <br />the workplace. In fact, Justice Kennedy, writing for the <br />majority in Ceballos, specifically recognized the existence <br />of whistleblower statutes as a course of action available to <br />those seeking to expose governmental wrongdoing. <br />The Minnesota WhisdebluwCLAc[prohibits an <br />employer from discharging, disciplining, threatening, <br />otherwise discriminating against, or penalizing an <br />employee regarding the employee's compensation, <br />terms, conditions, location, or privileges of employment <br />because: <br />(a) the employee, or a person acting on behalf of an <br />employee, in good faith, reports a violation or <br />suspected violation of any federal or state law or <br />rule adopted pursuant to law to an employer or <br />to any governmental body or law enforcement <br />official; <br />(b) the employee is requested by a public body or <br />office to participate in an investigation, hearing, <br />mqUlry; <br />(c) the employee refuses an employer's order to perform <br />an action that the employee has an objective basis <br />in fact to believe violates any state or federal law <br />contillued 011 page 4 <br /> <br />3 <br />