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<br />~ <br /> <br />2 <br /> <br />approaching those walls to leave their mark. Later an additional motivation developed whereby <br />these same kids began to view blank walls as something that was ugly and in need of graffiti. It <br />was the change in organic behaviour that drove the kids to the walls! Put another way, the walls <br />never changed! <br /> <br />This has two major lessons for CPTED. The first is that human behaviour is not static, it is <br />forever evolving. The second is that human behaviour drives physical design which in turn can <br />reinforce desired human behaviour. Any lesser perspective may fail to adapt to change or result <br />in limited success. This has major implications given a society where the respect for property and <br />property rights is losing its traditional influence as we will see later. <br /> <br />Criminals who don't act according to the CPTED playbook <br /> <br />Another limitation is the presumptive way that it treats offenders regardless of motivation or <br />type. CPTED, through its three main design concepts, effectively makes a presumption that an <br />abundance of natural surveillance, access control and territorial reinforcement will reduce the <br />fear and incidence of crime. What CPTED fails to take into account is that not all offenders play <br />by its rules. For instance, the graffiti vandals we spoke of earlier seek out highly visible <br />locations. This flies in the face of conventional CPTED wisdom and natural surveillance in <br />particular. <br /> <br />Natural surveillance is a design strategy that is directed at keeping intruders under observation. <br />Inherent to this strategy is a presumption that criminals prefer to operate in the shadows where <br />they are less likely to be seen. How then can CPTED be expected to effectively deal with crime <br />and criminals who fall outside its logic? The answer is simple. It cannot. <br /> <br />CPTED practitioners in the absence of an understanding of the graffiti subculture have no way of <br />properly diagnosing the problem. The tools are simply not there. That is why I have often <br />observed budding CPTED practitioners potentially aggravate a graffiti problem by calling for the <br />addition of light. What the CPTED practitioner fails to understand is that lighting these walls <br />simply makes them more attractive in the eyes of the graffiti artists. Graffiti vandals are <br />motivated by fame. Fame is achieved when a vandal's graffiti is displayed to the greatest number <br />of people. This can be achieved in a couple ways including lighting up the walls. By <br />understanding this motivation, it is easy to avoid aggravating the problem but the fact that it falls <br />outside of the CPTED paradigm can make it difficult for CPTED practitioners to sec. The same <br />holds true for other crimes. Bank robbery is a well documented example. <br /> <br />In 1985 the Bank Administration Institute of Rolling Meadows, Illinois undertook an extensive <br />six month review of how the interior design of banks affects the number oftim.es that a bank may <br />be robbed and the manner of the particular robberies. The study involved a thorough literature <br />review, an "archival" analysis of 204 bank robberies in the city of Seattle over a four and a half <br />year period and an extensive analysis of 54 victimized banking institutions that accounted for <br />111 of the robberies. <br /> <br />The study found that the interior elements of the bank do not seem to always be involved in the <br />same way as different "species" of bank robbers use the settings in different ways. Significant <br />amongst their findings were a number of conclusions that once were contrary to natural <br />surveillance. These included: <br />