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Page 5 of17 On July 17,2009, following the close of Plaintiffs case-in-chief, the parties came before the Court on Defendant's motion for involuntary dismissal of all of Plaintiffs claims. On July 22,2009, the Court denied Defendant's motion and further ruled that, while Plaintiff did not specifically state a claim for violation of procedural due process in its original complaint, the complaint was amended under rule 15.02 based upon the evidence presented by both parties at trial. Plaintiff has presented three claims which the Court must now rule upon. Plaintiff argues that the City has violated its equal protection, substantive due process, and procedural due process rights. II. Equal Protection Plaintiff's equal protection challenge arises as a response to Defendant's argument that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate hardship in connection with its application for variances. Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to make a showing of hardship in its application which would warrant the grant of a variance. Defendant further argues that the lack of a hardship showing was a threshold issue as, without it, the City could not have granted a variance even if so inclined. In response, Plaintiff alleges an equal protection violation, arguing that the City routinely issues variances without a showing of hardship and had done so with regard to several similarly situated properties near the time of their application. The Court allowed Plaintiff to pursue this theory at trial. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that government treat "all similarly situated people alike." Barstad v. Murray County, 420 F.3d 880, 884 (8th Cir. 2005). The threshold inquiry in a denied zoning applicant's equal protection claim is whether it is "similarly situated" to successful zoning applicants. Id. To establish that it is "similarly situated" to a successful applicant, a plaintiff first must demonstrate that the applications were subject to the same zoning requirements, standards, and criteria. See Anderson v. Douglas County, 4 F.3d 574, 577 (8th Cir. 1993) (parties not similarly situated because different requirements applied to plaintiffs application than to other applicants); Billy Graham v. City of Minneapolis, 667 N.W.2d 117, 126-27 (Minn. 2003) (parties not similarly situated where their applications involved different standards and criteria); Kottschade v. City of Rochester, 537 N.W.2d 301, 306 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (parties not similarly situated because applications implicated different regulations). Applicants are not similarly situated if they have different settings, circumstances, and impacts on their neighborhoods. See Bituminous Materials, Inc. v. Rice County, 126 F.3d 1068, 1072 (8th Cir. 1997) (asphalt plant and gravel pit not similarly situated to other asphalt plants and gravels pits in same county because each raises different public concerns); Minnetonka Moorings, Inc. v. City of Shore wood, 367 F. Supp.2d 1251,1256 (D.Minn. 2005) (marina on Gideon's Bay not similarly situated to marinas on other bays on same lake); Billy Graham, 667 N.W.2d at 127 http://www.minnlawyer.comluserfiles/pdf/Order..1020(F inal).htrn 9117/2009