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Page 8 ofl7 applications. The evidence further established that CPED staff makes recommendations regarding whether an applicant has demonstrated hardship based on a review of the application, and the City Council ultimately decides whether an applicant sufficiently demonstrated hardship based on the application. Absence of references to hardship in staff reports and City Council decisions granting variances does not necessarily show that applicants failed to demonstrate hardship in their applications or other materials. To show that other applicants failed to demonstrate hardship requires an examination of the actual applications. See also Order (May 7, 2009) (requiring Plaintiff to demonstrate "that there was an equal protection violation in the treatment of its application compared to other applications.") (emphasis added). Plaintiff failed to offer the applications of any applicant who a1legedly did not demonstrate hardship but who nevertheless was granted a variance. Because ofthis fundamental failure of proof, Plaintiff failed to establish an [2] essential element of its equal protection claim, i.e., that the other applicants are similarly situated. III. Substantive Due Process Plaintiff a1leged that the City acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying Plaintiff's application. Throughout the trial, Plaintiff made clear its intention to attack the findings contained in the CPED report as adopted by the City Council's Zoning and Planning Committee as lacking a factual basis. The original aJlegation and the pursuant actions of the parties and this Court make clear that the words arbitrary and capricious denote two claims: a Minnesota state law claim cha1lenging the City's findings and a Federal Constitutional Substantive Due Process claim. From the outset, it must be noted that although the wording is similar, these claims do not carry the same burdens. See Condor Corp. v. City of Saint Paul, 912 F.2d 215 (8th Cir. 1990). Under state law, "[r]egardless of whether the zoning matter is legislative (rezoning) or quasi-judicial (variances and special-use permits), we determine whether the municipality's action in the particular case was reasonable. We examine the municipality's action to ascertain whether it was arbitrary and capricious." VanLandschoot v. City of Mendota Heights, 336 N.W.2d 503, 508 (Minn. 1983). "A zoning decision is arbitrary ifthe applicant meets the standards specified by a certain zoning ordinance." Condor Corp. 912 F.2d at 221 (citing Zylka v. City of Crystal, 167 N.W.2d 45,49 (Minn. 1969)). Findings that a City's decision was arbitrary and capricious "should be reserved for those rare instances in which the City's decision has no rational basis. Except in such cases, it is the duty of the judiciary to exercise restraint and accord appropriate deference to civil authorities in the performance of their duties." White Bear Docking and Storage, Inc. v. City of White Bear Lake, 324 N.W.2d 174, 176 (Minn. 1982). As for Federal law, "a substantive due process claim in the zoning context exists, if at a1l, only in extraordinary situations and will not be found in 'run-of-the-mill' zoning disputes." Northpointe Plaza v. City of Rochester, 465 N.W.2d 686, 690 (Minn. 1991) "The test in the Eighth Circuit for determining whether there has been a violation of http://www.minnlawyer.com/userfiles/pdflOrder..1020(Final).htm 9/17/2009