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JUL -24 -2003 10:51 RATWIK ROSZRK MALONEY 612 339 0038 P.13 e Kevin J. Rupp . Erin X. Munson December 5, 2002 Page 3 Do common law principles of, conflict of interest preclude a school board member from voting on the termination of his or her spouse's employment contract's We answer your question in the affirmative ! ' The Minnesota Supreme. Court #pplies coinnion law conflict of interest principles to circumstances Where the, statutory provisions do not apply. See, e.g., Lenz v. Cann Creek Watershed District, 153 N.W.2d 209, 219 (1967); E. T. 0., Inc. v. Town of Marion* 375 N.W.2d i 815 (Minn. 1985). Under the common law test, a public officiai is not rn fitted to vote when the official has a direct conflict of interest in the outcome of the vote. 375 N.W. 2d at 820. The conflict, however, must be assessed according to five factors articulated by the Court in Lenz: (1) The nature of the decision being made; (2) the nature of the pecuniary interest; (3) the number of officials making the decision who are interested; (4) the need, if any,' : to have interested persons make the decision; and (5) the other means available, if any, such as the opportunity lor review, that serve to insure that the officials will net act arbitrarily to further their selfish interests. 153 N.W.2d at 219% In your letter, you sot forth your analysis of the application of the Lenz factors to the School District's situation as follows: Under the Lenz factors, and regarding the case at hand: (1) The decision is adjudicative in nature as the School Board members must look at the facts of the teacher's- conduct to determine whether they satisfy the statutory grounds for termination. - contained - in Minn. Stat. § . 1 2 ;4o# subd 9 and/or 13. (2) The pecuniary interest is very significant, as it involves the full -time employment of a teacher. (3) Only one School Board member has such a conflict of interest. (4) There is no need to require the -School Board member to vote on her husband's termination Request at 4. As you have explained the facts, the present case is similar to that in E.T.O. In that case, the town supervisor owned property across the street from E T. O., a bar which was.-seeking renewal of its liquor license. Ire finding that the town supervisor was ineligible to vote on whether to renew `.T.O.'s liquor license, the court found that the decision at issue in the case was adjudicative; the pecuniary interest of the town supervisor was substantial; only one town