Laserfiche WebLink
Mr. Welsch and Mr. Talbot <br />June 20, 2003 <br />Page 4 <br />Due to the fact that the language of the current Code provision is similar to the language <br />of the ordinance that was overturned in Project 80's, it could face a similar analysis and a <br />similar result. As with the ordinances in Project 80's, the current Code provision may not <br />really prevent crime when it allows strangers approaching a residence to leave a handbill. It <br />may not protect the privacy of those that welcome uninvited solicitors. Privacy is more Easily <br />protected by prohibiting solicitation at places in which a sign has been posted rejecting <br />solicitation. <br />Fu-rthe n o re, and in terms of the traditional justification that municipal lti es give for <br />regulating this kind of speech, the current Code's differentiation between different 'kinds of <br />commercial speech is troubling. This differentiation could give rise to serious' problerns were <br />the City to attempt to justify the ordinance on the basis of protecting privacy, or preyenti ng <br />crime, or any of the other traditional justifications. A peddler of eggs or other farm produce is <br />treated differently than a peddler of pots and pans. Different commercial speech may be treated <br />differently `erentl as long as the substantial in to rest asserted her the government necessitating the <br />regulation will still be achieved. For instance, prohibiting unsolicited fax advertising while <br />p g g <br />permitting livp telemarketing phone calls 'i's permissible because the difference i Q consistent <br />with the government's interest in protecting the public from hearing the costs of unwanted <br />advertising. It may be difficult to justify the ordinance in terms of preventing crime unless the <br />City can show that there is no crime potential inherent with these who offer milk, dairy <br />products, vegetables, poultry, or eggs versus those who want to sell pots and pans, vacuums <br />cleaners, or other goods and wares. It could be difficult to justify the ordinance in terms of <br />privacy interests given that the s arne person who doesn }t want someone to come selling pots <br />and pans may also not want someone corning to their house to try to sell eggs or poultry, <br />Therefore, we believe the current Code provision would stands a chance of being <br />over turned if challenged on the basis that it differentiates between commercial speech in a moray <br />that leaves the regulation incapable of achieving the government } s interest. we also believe <br />that the current Code prevision could stand a chance of being overturned on the basis that it is <br />not sufficiently narrowly tailored to protect ghat interests it coup be claimed to be promoting. <br />In addition, an equal protection challenge could arise when different commercial speech is <br />regulated in different manners .6 -We have not analyzed that issue in detail, as it is unnecessary <br />in light of the above conclusions. <br />Dike other speech, commercial speech is subject to content neutral time, place and <br />manner restrictions! as with other speech restrictions, the advancement of governmental <br />State 0 <br />f Missouri w. American Blast Fax, Inc. 323 F.3 d 649, 656-58 ($ h z r.2o03 ). <br />See Carey v. Brown, 447 J.S. 455 (1980). w <br />7 See 44 Liquornzart, Inc. w. State of Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996). <br />