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. Welsch and Mr. Talbot June 20, 2003 Page 4 Due to the fact that the language of the current Code provision is similar to the language of the ordinance that was overturned in Project 8 s, it could face a similar analysis and a similar result. As with the ordinances in Project 80's, the current Code provision may not really prevent crime when it allows strangers approaching a residence to leave a handbill. It may not protect the privacy of those that welcome uninvited solicitors. Pfivacy is more easily protected by prohibiting solicitation at places in which a sign has been posted rejecting solicitation. Furthermore, and in terms of the traditional justification that municipalities give for regulating this kind of speech, the current Code's differentiation between different kinds of commercial speech is troubling. This differentiation could give rise to serious problems were the City to attempt to justify the ordinance on the basis of protecting privacy, or preventing crime, or any of the other traditional justifications. A peddler of eggs or other farm produce is treated differently than a peddler of pots and pans. Different commercial speech may be treated differently as long as the substantial interest asserted by the government necessitating the regulation will still be achieved. For instance, prohibiting unsolicited fax advertising while permitting live telemarketing phone calls is permissible because the difference is consistent with the government's interest in protecting the public from bearing the costs of unwanted advertising. It may be difficult to justify the ordinance in terms of preventing crime unless the City can show that there is no crime potential inherent with those who offer milk, dairy products, vegetables, poultry, or eggs versus those who want to sell pots and pans, vacuum cleaners, or other goods and wares. It could be difficult to justify the ordinance in terms of privacy interests given that the same person who doesn't want someone to come selling pots and pans may also not want someone conning to their house to try to sell eggs or poultry. Therefore, a belie a the current Code provision would stand a chance of being overtume 1 e allenged on the basis that it differentiates between commercial speech in a way that leaves the regulation incapable of achieving the government's interest. we also believe that the current Code provision could stand a chance of being overturned on the basis that it i s not sufficiently narrowly tailored to protect what interests it could be claimed to be promoting. In addition, an equal protection challenge could arise when different commercial speech is regulated in different maxi ers. we have not analyzed that issue in detail, as it is unnecessary in light of the above conclusions. Like other speech, connnercial speech is subject to content neutral time, place and manner restrictions .7 Also, as with other speech restrictions, the advancement of governmental State of Missouri v. American Blast Fax, Inc. 323 F.3d 649, 656 -58 (81, ir.2003). 6 see Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1 980). 7 see 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. State of Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 4$4} 501 (1996 ).