Laserfiche WebLink
The government had invested $112 billion in the companies by the end of2OO9to keep <br />them functioning and has committed to double that to $200 billion. This allowed the <br />companies to generate $1.3trillion in single-family mortgage-backed securities (MBS) <br />in 2009, up 39 percent from 2008. Their single-family portfolios have continued to <br />decline in quality: during the quarter ended November 30, 2009, loans in any stage of <br />delinquency increased to 7.6 percent of their combined portfolios. Most of these delin- <br />quencies have been in their single-family portfolios; their multifamily portfolios continue <br />to perform well. <br />The administration said it would offer proposal for restructuring Fannie Mae and <br />Freddie Mac in February 2010, but failed to do so; it now says 'it will not present a pro- <br />posal until 2011, at the earliest. Thus, little is known about what the administration is <br />thinking. However, it is unlikely that legislation reforming the companies will be enacted <br />in 2O1O,an election year with a shortened and already crowded legislative agenda. <br />Reforming Ronnie and Freddie will be extremely controversial. <br />The Treasury Department announced in December 2OO9 that b would continue to provide <br />oophaL as needed to the companies for the next three years to assure investors of federal <br />backing and enable the companies to continue actively supporting housing markets. <br />When the companies were placed in conservatorship, they were required to begin <br />reducing the size of their portfolios in 2010. In December2OO9, Treasury relaxed this <br />requirement. This will allow the companies to continue buying mortgages, which is <br />especially important 'if the Fed's program of buying mortgage securities ends as sched- <br />uled in spring 2O1O. <br />There islittle reason for the administration to push for reform of the companies suthis <br />time. The federal government is now their conservator, regulator, and primary investor. <br />As such, it is able to use the companies as a virtual federal agency, working with FH/\ to <br />keep the housing markets Liquid and support the administration's mortgage modification <br />efforts. Yet the companies remain "'independent" entities because of the technicalities of <br />the conservatorship law, so their liabilities remain off the federal balance sheet. <br />The time to reform or replace the companies is not umiLthe housing markets recover <br />and no longer need such active federal support. Proposals have ranged from fully <br />privatizing them to making them federal agencies; neither alternative is likely. If they <br />become federal agencies, their liabilities are added to an already swelling federal debt, <br />a sensitive issue these days. Fully privatizing them, on the other hand, noises the risk <br />that there will be no way the federal government can effectively maintain credit flows to <br />the housing markets during credit crises, which seem to occur with annoying regularity <br />once a decade. Housing is too large a Fart of the U.S. economy and too poLitiooUysensi- <br />tive for the government not to have effective tools to support it when needed. <br />Nor is it Likely that they will exit conservatorship unchanged. The old model is widely <br />viewed as flawed, given the conflicting incentives of maximizing stockholder value and <br />prmidingaffordablemortgagestomodecue- andmiddle-incomeAmerioons. <br />BAN <br />