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JAN-06-2003 14:23 RATWIK ROSZAK MALONEY 6123390038 P.10 Mr. Neal Beets January 6, 2003 Page 4 of6 Finally, restrictions on the use of facilities must leave open ample alternative channels of communication. The basic test is whether the speaker is afforded "a forum that is accessible and where the intended audience is expected to pass." Students Against Apartheid Coalition v. O'Neil, 660 F. Supp. 333, 339 (W.D. Va. 1987). A similar analysis would apply to any ordinance that appears neutral on its face, but operates in such a way as to deny access to City facilities to one particular group. As stated above, any restrictions on the use of City meeting facilities must be content neutral. Analytically, there are two aspects to the principle of content neutrality: viewpoint neutrality and category neutrality. This means that the City cannot regulate meeting room use so as to favor one viewpoint over another, and cannot discriminate between different categories of expression, regardless of whether the restriction on facility use is presented as a facially neutral regulation. Under the category of viewpoint neutrality, to which the Supreme Court has recognized no exceptions, the government cannot regulate expression in such a way as to favor one . '. .. r1 If' l.'...:t . 11 v-.. 1 ,. 'I '1 vIewpoint over fu"10tnef. jO~ lor eXal"11ple, a City COUlO not auow access to Kepuoncan.s \Vlll.r.e denying access to Democrats. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Martin Luther King Jr. Worshippers, 735 F.Supp. 745 (M.D. Tenn. 1990). As the Supreme Court has stated, viewpoint discrimination is "an egregious form of content discrimination," Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors Qfthe. Univ. ofVirgini~ 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). The government "must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction. H Id. Under the framework of category neutrality, government cannot generally regulate in such a way as to discriminate against different categories of expression. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975). For example, a city could not pass an ordinance limiting access to meeting facilities to only non-political groups., even if the ordinance operated to limit the access of groups with a variety of different political viewpoints. Finally, a city cannot regulate an organization's message by charging different fees to different groups for use of city facilities. If a city charges a fee for use of city property to hold a meeting, this fee must be the same for all organizations wishing to use the property. Forsvth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992) (rejecting a permit scheme where the fee for police protection could be increased if the speaker was likely to generate controversy.) II. Under The City's Current Facility Use Policy, If A Community Group Uses A City Meeting Room, Can The Group Exclude Members Of The Public From (1) Attending The Meeting, And/Or (2) Joining The Organization? Park and Recreation Operating Policy No. lOP governs the use of City facilities. In its purpose statement, the Policy indicates that ~The City of Rose vi lIe maintains facilities for the