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January 27, 2003 Page 3 Thus, the City Council may have the power to change the designation so long as it does not have a contract with the Pioneer Press. This supposition raises the question of whether, by accepting the offer of the Pioneer Press, the City Council formed a contract. This issue was neither presented to, nor addressed by, the Attorney General in the 1962 opinion. Under basic principles of contract formation, a contract is formed when a party solicits offers, a second party makes an offer in response to the solicitation, the first party accepts that offer. Mere negotiations for a contract do not constitute a contract in themselves. 451 Corp. v. Pension System, 310 N.W.2d 922 (Minn. 1981). But a party can accept a contract either by communicating directly to the offerors or by words or actions put into a form which is in fact communicated to the offeror before revocation. Id. It is enough to form a contract merely if the offeror receives notification of the offeree's acceptance. Id. Whether a contract is formed isjudged by the objective conduct of the parties and not their subjective intent. Gresser v. Hotzler, 604 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. App. 2000). There is some authority for the proposition that action by govenling body of a government entity may constitute acceptance of a contract. For example, in 451 Corp. the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that a resolution by the board of trustees of the City of Detroit's public pension fund could constitute acceptance of a proposed nlortgage contract because the terms of the resolution were definite the resolution declared board's resolve to the 310 N. W .2d at 924. The same logic applies here: the City Council's motion of January 6,2003, comlTIunicated a definite acceptance of the Pioneer Press's offer. Further, the motion did not place any conditions on the City Council's acceptance besides a condition that was already part of the original solicitation, that is, that the newspaper meet the qualifications of Minnesota Statutes section 331A.Ol. Compare Id. (where board action did not give rise to a contract because its acceptance was nlade pursuant to the additional condition of approval by counsel). If a contract was indeed fomled by the City Council's motion of January 6, and the City Council nevertheless changes the designation, the Pioneer Press could sue for breach of contract, seeking a range of remedies. These could include recovery of any damages incurred as a result of the breech or "specific performance," that is, a requirement that the City Council honor the contract with the Pioneer Press. While the Pioneer Press ITIay not, ultimately, prevail in such an action, the cost of defending against such a lawsuit could be significant. B. if a contract has not been formed, the Pioneer Press may also have a valid claim that a change in designation would violate its due process rights under the U.S. Constitution. The Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution creates both substantive and procedural rights. The former type of right is not at issue here; substantive due process requires an egregious set of facts to support a clainl. 846 F.2d 469 (8th Cir. 1987) (explaining that in order to be so egregious as to call question substantive due process, the city's action would have to be based on something as arbitrary as a coin flip). Procedural process, however, deals with basic concepts of fairness. city violates a party's procedural due process rights if it deprives that party of a liberty or property interest to which it has a legitimate clainl of entitlement. L&H Sanitation, Inc. v.