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pf07-021
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Planning Files
Planning Files - Planning File #
07-021
Planning Files - Type
Planned Unit Development
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I <br />r ,, • <br />MEMORANDUM <br />TO: Scott T. Anderson, File, Jay T. Squires <br />FROM: Scott T. Anderson <br />DATE: May 24, 2007 <br />RE: Roseville Retainer <br />Our File No. 4002(1)-0001 <br />SUBJECT: Livingston/AUAR <br />• <br />I looked over provisions of Minn. Stat. Ch. 116D and Minn. R. Ch. 4410. The <br />issue I was looking at to get some guidance on was whether an AUAR stops the running <br />of the 60 days under Minn. Stat. § 15.99. <br />The starting point for the analysis is the 60-day rule. Minn. Stat. § 15.99, <br />subd. 3(d) states that the time liinit in subd. 2 is extended if a state statute, federal law, or <br />court order requires a process to occur before the agency acts on the request, and the time <br />periods prescribed in the state statute, federal law, or court order make it impossible to <br />act on the request within 60 days. <br />The above provision has been interpreted in the case of Allen v. City of Mendota <br />Hei h�ts, 694 N.W.2d 799 (Minn. App. 205). In that case there was a petition for an <br />EAW. The Allen court concluded that a plain reading of § 15.99 and MEPA <br />unambiguously supported a tolling of the 60-day time period under subd. 3(d) of the 60- <br />day rule. In doing so, the court looked not only to Minn. Stat. § 116D.04, but also to the <br />rules promulgated thereunder. One of the things Allen noted was that both MEPA and <br />the 4410 Rules "specifically inandate that environmental review of projects takes priority <br />by prohibiting granting a permit, approving a project, or beginning a project until the <br />environmental-review process is complete." While it was conceivable that a part of the <br />environmental review process could be completed within 60 days (such as a decision on a <br />petition for an EAW) the court noted that � 15.99 did not require breaking down a <br />statutory "process" into parts and applying the impossibility standard to each of the parts. <br />Allen, at p. 803. Thus, the petition for an EAW initiated a process that must occur before <br />the agency could act on the written request under Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2. <br />It looks to me like it is likely that that same analysis would apply to an AUAR. I <br />say "likely" because of soine language concerns I have, some of which were alleviated by <br />the analysis employed in the Allen case. Minn. Stat § 116D.04, subd. 2(b) states that if <br />
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