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<br /> <br />SERIES <br /> <br />.f an ordinance 1\.... : <br />. !Y!Inn Stat. <br />s. 1-5 ~1988) (1987 ~,. <br />10). This enabling statute. <br />the problems and financial <br />by the 1986 closing of an- ' <br />e park in the City, Lyndale ; <br /> <br />sed the proposed ordinan <br />cil. ce <br />oun meetings in Septe ; <br />m. -. <br />989. Arcadia and its coun.f <br />:;e.d the ordinance at each " <br />'dinance nevertheless \Vas <br />1e effective on December <br /> <br />official purpose is stated ' <br /> <br />~culiar nature and prob- <br />by the closure or conver_ <br />:n-ed home parks, the City <br />.t the public health, safety <br />tare will be promoted by <br />nsation to displaced res i- <br />rks. The purpose of this <br />uire park owners to pay <br />Its reasonable relocation <br />'laSers of manufactured <br />lay additional compensa- <br />) the authority granted <br />ta Statutes, Section <br /> <br />City Ord. 89-57 (codified <br />nn. City Code Art. VI, <br />1ce generally requires a <br />a displaced resident the <br />elocating a mobile home <br />cated within a 25-mile <br />Jeing closed. If a resi- <br />" the resident may ten- <br />chaser of the park and <br /> <br />arely moved once placed in <br />igh cost and difficulty of <br />nobile home owner wishes <br />orne is usually sold in place <br />ntinues to rent the pad on <br />ated. When a park closes, <br />1e and the ability to sell a <br />: dramatically. Thus, resi. <br />II or most of the value in <br />oark owner chooses to sell <br />different and likely more <br /> <br />ARCADIA DEVELOP. v. CITY OF BLOOMINGTON <br />. Cite as 552 N.W.2d 281 (MJun.App. 1996) <br />.: . compensation equal to the amount of matter of law. Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. <br />- ~; assessed value of the home. To Wh~. the material facts are not in disP.ute: a <br />~J>cl:, a park owner's investment, the ordi- reVlewmg court need not defer to the district <br />a-v---haS a "cap," which limits the "total court's application of the law. Hubred v. <br />::nsation to be paid to displaced resi- Control Da1a Corp., 442 N.W.2d 308, 310 <br />dents by the park owner and purchaser" to (Minn.1989). <br />" percent of the purchase price of the park. [1, 2] Statutes and local ordIDances are <br />In May 1992, Arcadia entered into a pur- presumed valid and will not be declared un- <br />chaSe agreement with Wal-Mart, Inc. The . constitutional unless clearly shown to be so. <br />agreement was subject to several contingen- City of St. Paul v~ Kekedakis, 293 Minn. 334, <br />des, including reduction in the purchase 336, 199 N.W.2d 151, 153 (1972); State v. <br />price by the amount it would cost to comply EUis, 476 N.W.2d 662, 664 (Minn.App.1991), <br />with the ordinance and approval of certain review denied (MinD. Dec. 13, 1991). The <br />zoning changes that had been requested by party challenging a statute or ordinance's <br />City staff. Those. zoning changes were sub- constitutionality has the burden of proof. <br />sequently approved by the City council based EUis, 476 N.W.2d at 664. <br />on Wal-Mart and Arcadia's agreement to <br />abide by a number of conditions, including <br />compliance with the relocation ordinance. <br />Collins Park was closed on February 22, <br />1994. Because there were ample vacancies <br />within a 25-mile radius of the park, mobile <br />homes that physically could be moved were <br />moved. Only five of the 90 homes remaining <br />in the park at the time of closing had to be <br />acquired. Arcadia sold the property to Wal- <br />Mart for $2,338,842.66" after deducting relo- <br />cation expenses of $363,128.71. <br />Arcadia brought this action in September <br />1994. It claims that as a result of the City's <br />adoption of the ordinance, it lost potential <br />buyers and was forced to sell the property <br />for substantially less than its market value. <br /> <br />,l <br /> <br />{ <br /> <br />.". i <br /> <br />:~ >: <br /> <br />J <br />, <br />, <br /> <br />ISSUES <br />I. Did the district court err in granting <br />summary judgment to the City on Arcadia's <br />takings claim? <br />II. Did the district court err in granting <br />swmnary judgment to the City on Arcadia's <br />substantive due process and equal protection <br />claims? <br />III. Did the district court err in granting <br />summary judgment to the City on Mildred <br />Collins's claim of intentional infliction of emo- <br />tional distress? <br /> <br />ANALYSIS <br />Sununary judgment is proper when there <br />are no genuine issues of material fact and <br />either party is entitled to judgment as a <br /> <br />Minn. 285 <br /> <br />.L <br /> <br />Takings analyses often involve factual in- <br />quiries that make summary judgment inap- <br />propriate. Nevertheless, a court may eval- <br />uate the legal significance of undisputed <br />material facts without forcing parties to <br />triaL See 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. Unit- <br />ed States, 48 F.3d - 1575, 1580 (Fed.Cir. <br />1995) ("Even though a regulatory taking <br />analysis is normally ad hoc and fact-inten- <br />sive, the [defendant] may still be entitled <br />to judgment as a matter of law."). Be- <br />cause Arcadia's takings claim rests not on <br />genuine issues of material fact, but on Ar- <br />cadia's disagreement with the applicable Ie- <br />.gal standards and analyses to apply, it is <br />amenable to summary judgment. See Out- <br />doOT Sys., Inc. v. City of Mesa, 997 F.2d <br />604, 618 (9th Cir.1993); Chesapeake Out- <br />doOT Enters., Inc. v. MayOT & City Coun- <br />cil of Baltimore, 89 Md.App. 54, 597 A.2d <br />503, 512-13 (1991). <br /> <br />1. Takings Analysis Under the United <br />States Constitution <br /> <br />The Takings Clause states: "[N]or shall <br />private property be taken for public use, <br />without just compensation." U.S. Const. <br />Amend. V. Its purpose is "to bar Govern- <br />ment from forcing some people alone to bear <br />public burdens which, in all fairness and <br />justice, should be borne by the public as a <br />whole." Armstrong v. United States, 364 <br />U.S. 40, 49, 80 S.Ct. 1563, 1569, 4 L.Ed.2d <br /> <br />