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This said, however, I in no way wish to distance myself from the Appeal or the contents of the Appeal letter. I fully support every word that is written in it. In fact, I contributed greatly to the drafting of it. I only wish to point out and stress that by identifying me as the party primarily responsible for the appeal greatly diminishes the input, contribution, and the overall voice of the sixty-three (63) other affected neighbors that have participated as the Appellants in the appeal. Their participation should not be discounted by the misguided attempt to place the spotlight on me as the proverbial ring leader. The Appellants are good, sincere, and knowledgeable people. Their voices are equal to mine and they should be treated that way. (2) THE CITY ATTORNEY IS MISTAKEN. I believe that the City Attorney has mischaracterized the Appellants' use of statutory authority. (RCA Attachment B, p. l -2; PDF, p.36-7). Indeed, Mr. Gaughan mistakes Appellants' citation to Minn. Stat. § 273.13, subd. 23(f),(g) (2008)2 as having been cited for the proposition that it was binding authority in municipality land use determinations. (Id. at 1.) The Appeal letter was absolutely clear that its use was for "illustrative" or "illuminating" purposes. (Appeal Letter, p.2 n.4; p. 3.). Indeed, in referring to Minn. Stat. § 273.13, the Appeal letter clearly stated that the section was a property tax provision: "the property tax classification provisions of the Minnesota statutes are quite illustrative and are often used for defining agricultural products and land use. See e.g., City of Plymouth Zoning Ord. § 21005.02." (Appeal Letter, p.2 n.4.)(emphasis added). I also believe Mr. Gaughan inaccurately rejects Minn. Stat. § 315.47 (2008) as "pertain[ing] solely to property owned by YMCAs and YWCAs." (RCA Attachment B, p. 2; PDF, p. 37). I fail to see any language in section 315.47 specifically narrowing the applicability of that particular provision to only corporations known as a Young Men's Christian Association or a Young Women's Christian Association. Chapter 315 of the Minnesota Statutes pertains to all "religious associations" and just because Minn. Stat. § 315.44 specifically addresses the formation of YMCAs and YWCAs does not mean that all subsequent statutory provisions in the chapter relate to that same topic. Section 315.47 has as its unique label "property rights" and states in pertinent part: "[p]roperty and its income under the control of the board must be devoted only to the purposes of the association." Minn. Stat. § 315.47 (2008). Chapter 315 pertains broadly to "religious associations" and section 315.47 does not specifically restrict the general use of the term "association" to Young Men's or Women's Christian Associations. I think that Mr. Gaughan has tried to read language into section 315.47 that is just not there. See Lindberg v. Health Partners, Inc., 599 N. W.2d 572, 578 (Minn. 1999)(stating that "it is not for the courts to read into a clear statutory scheme something that plainly is not there."). What's more, the Appeal letter also noted that NCPC's governing documents were specifically enacted pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 315. (Appeal Letter, p. 5)(citing NCPC Bylaws art. I, § l .); see Diedrick v. Helm, z "Real estate of less than ten acres, which is exclusively or intensively used for raising or cultivating agricultural products, shall be considered as agricultural land." Minn. Stat. § 273.13, subd. 23(f) (2008). "Land shall be classified as agricultural even if all or a portion of the agricultural use of that property is the leasing to, or use by another person for agricultural purposes."Id., subd. 23(g). 2