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Walz (1970) and Mueller (1983) allowed property <br />tax exemptions for churches and tax deductions for <br />parochial school tuition, respectively. Hunt (1973), the <br />Court's only decision on tax-exempt bonds and the <br />Establishment Clause, strongly indicates the Court's <br />doubts about whether tax-exempt imancing is, in fact, <br />state aid at all within the meaning of the Establishment <br />Clause. Numerous state supreme court cases assume <br />this basic perspective also. <br />Thus, the authority for concluding that tax <br />benefits are indirect rather than direct aid programs is <br />also clear and compelling. <br />Tax-exempt fmancing is a particular kind of tax <br />benefit, which comes in many forms and is available to <br />a wide variety of eligible entities besides faith-based <br />organizations. Authorizing statutes provide a multi- <br />faceted program for addressing various public purposes <br />and are neutral in purpose and neutral in effect with <br />regard to religion. <br />Tax-exempt fmancing is indirect aid in two respects. <br />First, tax-exempt financing is the most attenuated of tax <br />benefits discussed by the courts, sometimes compared to a <br />mere governmental service, like police or fire protection. <br />Further, Zelman directly governs tax-exempt fmancing <br />because the benefits of tax-exempt financing are mediated <br />to institutions through the independent decision-making <br />exemplif'ied by the market. The benefits are provided <br />directly to bondholders who receive the direct benefit of <br />exemption from taxation, rather than to tax-exempt <br />borrowers who may or may not receive a financial benefit <br />in the form of lower rates, because the markets receive the <br />benefit and "decide" how much to pass through to <br />borrowers. Further, the markets neither favor nor disfavor <br />religiosity: it simply has no impact whatsoever in this <br />decision making process. <br />Thus, tax-exempt bond financing, even for <br />pervasively sectarian institutions, should normally not be <br />subject to constitutional challenge on Establishment <br />Clause grounds, because these attenuated benefits are <br />indirect, and because they are mediated through the private <br />decision-making of the financial markets on a basis which <br />is wholly neutral between the religious and non-religious. <br />NEW CLIMATE REVISITED <br />New Climate identified a matrix of factors governing <br />Establishment Clause analyses. Neutrality is the sine qua <br />non for constitutionality. The interplay of the other factors <br />- whether aid is direct or indirect the nature of the <br />activities assisted, the nature of the institution assisted; <br />whether participation in, or benefits or burdens of aid <br />programs are determined on the basis of religion, and <br />whether other constitutional rights or duties come into <br />play • determine the level of constitutional scrutiny. <br />After Zelman, the matrix is more useful than ever. <br />As we have seen: <br />� I f aid is neutral and indirect, constitutional <br />scrutiny is low. <br />Conversely, scrutiny will be somewhat higher <br />ifaid is direct. <br />"Special dangers" of endorsement or <br />entanglement may come into play if direct aid is <br />to religious or pervasively sectarian institutions, <br />particularly those involved in essentially <br />religious activities. <br />Aid for specifically religious activities is least <br />likely to be constitutional, absent other <br />circumstances. <br />However, if either of the final two factors of <br />the matrix comes into play and individual <br />rights are adversely affected or ordinary <br />participation in society is undermined, then <br />even religious institutions, religious activities <br />and direct aid may be permissible (or even <br />necessary) in some circumstances. <br />The application of the last two components of the <br />matrix, particularly in the context of direct aid to religious <br />entities, remains somewhat unresolved. Some recent cases <br />strongly indicate that refusing to allow an otherwise <br />eligible religious institution or an individual to participate <br />in a neutral program might be unconstitutional Content- <br />based speech discrimination or a free exercise violation. <br />Counsel for governmental entities in these circumstances <br />would be well advised to review these decisions with care, <br />for their focus on individual religious and speech liberties <br />provides provocative clues as to the most likely ultunate <br />resolution of this conflict. <br />For more information on this topic, please contact Jeffrey 0. Lewis at <br />(317) 236-2334, or via e-mail at jeffrey.lewis@icemiller.com. <br />For atltlitional copies of current publications, contact the Business <br />Development Department at (317) 236-2434. Please visit our Internet <br />Web site at WWWICBl111��Bl.COl1'1 for more information about Ice Miller. <br />This publication is intentletl for general information purposes only antl <br />tloes not antl is not intentletl to constitute legal ativice. The reatler <br />must consult with legal counsel to tletermine how laws or tlecisions <br />tliscussetl herein apply to the reatler's specific circumstances. <br />Copyright 2002 Ice Miller. All rights reservetl. <br />One American Square Box 62001 Indianapolis, IN 46282-0002 P 317-236-2100 F 317-236-2219 wWW.iCCmilltf.CORI <br />Indianapolis Chicago Washington, �.�. <br />