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<br />Comrnunin' Resvonse to the Threat of Terrorism -~ A Public Entitv Risk Institute SvmlJosium
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<br />We have moved past the use of chain-link fences, barbed wire or razor wire,
<br />Granted thallhese things will keep out many, bul those who are delermined can easily get
<br />past such low-tech devices. And you can not use these devices to protect public buildings,
<br />although Ihey are somewhat effective for protecting operational facilities (treatment plants,
<br />transit stations, etc,), especially when used in concert with closed circuit television, high
<br />intensity lighling and fences equipped with motion sensors, A vulnerability analysis will
<br />assist you in ultimately selecting the optimum way that you might prolect you facilities,
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<br />A vulnerability analysis looks at what might be done to damage the operalion of a
<br />facility or system; what is located nearby which, if damaged, might have an impacl on the
<br />quality of life, health, or economy in adjacent parts of the area; and whal alternative
<br />systems mighl exisl to replace those Ihat are damaged or deslroyed, Is il practical to protect
<br />these facilities or should or could they be relocated to reduce or eliminale the risk? Finally,
<br />how would your jurisdiction recover iflhe subject of your study was damaged or 10s1 to
<br />use?
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<br />A number of factors will complicate your work. These include the age of your
<br />infrastructure, who has jurisdiction (public or private), existence of redundancy, the
<br />praclicality of replacement or redesign, and the availability of funding to complete the
<br />necessary work. A half completed project is probably worse than no projecl at all.
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<br />You cannot keep people out of a subway syslem nor can you build a wall around a
<br />watershed, Transportation facilities, railroads, airports, and highways allow the movement
<br />of thousands of people and millions of pounds of goods daily, II is impossible to keep oul
<br />Ihose that are intent on doing damage, yet we must do all that we can to make condilions as
<br />safe as possible,
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<br />Look at the risks and lry 10 develop answers to the following:
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<br />. Ifwe cannot eliminate the risk, can we develop a warning system that will
<br />activate a response Ihat will minimize it?
<br />. Have we eslablished and tested evacuation routes?
<br />. What can be done to mitigate the risk? Relocation?
<br />. Is there, or can you develop, a recovery plan?
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<br />Regardless oflhe complexity of your buildings and facilities, some very basic sleps
<br />need to be followed,
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<br />These include key control, attention to keeping windows closed and locked at
<br />night, alert security staff, evacuation plans that are tested on a regular basis, and a building
<br />population that participates in the same way a "Neighborhood Watch" group does, And, no
<br />one is allowed to by-pass the security devices - no one, no favorites, just provide the same
<br />level of scrutiny for all, No exceptions shall be allowed, Once again, you should not try 10
<br />convince the tenanls Ihat they are perfectly safe, because they are not, A false sense of
<br />security is the most dangerous environment that you can provide,
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<br />Public Works and Terrorism
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