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July 27, 2003 <br />Page 10 <br />In a situation where an elected official seeks reimbursement for criminal defense costs <br />incurred by him, it is thus clear that that elected official should not take part in any voting on <br />the matter. Additionally, that official should not even participate in the process leading to that <br />decision. See attached Attorney General Opinion dated December 5, Zoo. When the official <br />controls the conduct of the meeting at which such a decision is discussed and/or made, that <br />official should turn over the control of the proceedings to someone else. The failure to do so <br />could give r'se to an argument of conflict of interest, lead to an appearance of impropriety, and <br />arguments that the manner in which the official governed the proceedings did not allow for <br />reasonable and proper consideration of the issues. <br />In this case, it is therefore our opinion that the Council should decide any <br />reimburserncnt issue. If the Mayor seeps to have the City reimburse hire for the costs and <br />reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the Mayor in defending the charges brought against him <br />under Minn. Stat. § 471-87 and Minn. Stat. § 6 o 9.4 (), the Mayor should submit an itemized <br />statement from the attorney that shows all attorney's fees and costs incurred. The Mayor <br />should not tale part in the decision or the discussion process. The Council Member who is <br />deemed to be the Acting Mayor in the Mayor's absence should conduct that portion of the <br />meetin g in which the discussion occurs.8 <br />Stqpdard for Deter inigg Reimbursement <br />Minn. Stat. § 465-76 indicates that a municipality may pay for an officer's criminal <br />defense costs when the charges arise out of conduct that can be said to be the "reasonable and <br />lawful performance of duties" for the municipality. Only one case decided under that statute <br />gives direct guidance on the issue. As noted earlier, Kroschel indicated that the unintentional <br />violation of a criminal statute, or statute of a criminal nature, could be found to be arising out <br />of the reasonable and lawful performance of the duties of the city. In that case it involved <br />allegations of a violation of the Open Meeting Law. Certainly taking part in meetings, and <br />roaring decisions as to whether meetings are opened or closed, is part of the performance of <br />the duties of an official of a city. <br />The issue really becomes one of what is reasonable under the facts and circumstances <br />surrounding the question. This may not really differ whether one were to look at Minn. Stat. <br />465.7 6, Minn. Stat. § 466.07, or Minn. Stat. § 317A.521. Remember that under 317A.521, <br />the nonprofit corporation has to determine that the officer acted in good faith, did not receive <br />any improper personal benefit, did not have reasonable cause to believe that the conduct was <br />unlawful, and reasonably believed that the conduct was in the best interests of the corporation. <br />$ In the fiat instance, it would be our opinion and advice that the Mayor declare himself to have a conflict on this issue due <br />to his pecuniary interest in the outcome. In the event that the Mayor, or any other official under similar circumst ncest <br />were to fail to do so, then it is for the municipality to decide in the first instance whether the disqualifying conflict of <br />interest is present. In multiple .Attorney General opinions, the Attorney General's Office for the state of Minncsota has <br />stated this to be the procedure which is followed. See, e&., Op. AtVy Gen. 90e -5 (Feb. 253 1954). <br />