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2003_0731.special_packet
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2003_0731.special_packet
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July 27, 2003 <br />Page 11 <br />One can readily say that the requirements set forth in Chapter 317A in this regard are nothing <br />other than giving definition to the phrase ``reasonable, "' <br />Guidance can also be found under Minn. Stat. § 466.07. Remember that under that <br />statute a municipality is required to defend and indenmify officers and employees in claims for <br />damages providing that the officer or employee was not guilty of malfeasance in office, willful <br />neglect of duty, or bad faith. So, for instance, in Queen V. MinneaDolis Public School District, <br />481 N.W.2d 6 (Minn. App. 1992), a teacher who engaged in a sexual relationship with a <br />student was guilty of `'malfeasance in office" and therefore had no right to indemnification. In <br />re Olson, 300 N.W. 3 (Minn. 1941) willful neglect of duty was said to be the careless or <br />g Y <br />intentional failure to exercise due diligence in the performance of an official duty. <br />All of the statutes and different ways of phrasing the issue appear to have a common <br />element of knowledge within them. One can analogize it to the concept in the criminal lain of <br />intent versus specific intent. One can certainly intend to do an act which is ultimately <br />concluded to be violation of a law. But the requirement of specific intent is one that not only <br />was the act itself intentional, but at the time of the act there was a knowledge that the act was <br />unlawful. we think that is the distinction being drawn in the Kroschel case. we think that is <br />the guiding distinction that we can give the Council in this case. <br />P <br />Elected off ials are citizen decision makers. They are not always trained in the law. In <br />most instances they are not. There are innumerable statutes and rules that an elected officio <br />can unwittingly step over in exercising the duties of their office. There may be and there are <br />many people who are willing to act in those circumstances to allege impropriety on the part of <br />elected officals. The reimbursement statute, which was not passed until 1984, helps alleviate <br />the potentially chilling effect that can exist in charged political atmospheres that may keep <br />citizens from seeping office because they fear that if they make a misstep they may incur the <br />expenses that can be associated with defending themselves against charges of wrongdoing. we <br />i be g <br />think what s reasonable needs to looked at in light of these considerations also. <br />In making the reimbursement decision, we believe that the Council must consider <br />whether the charges of a criminal nature brought against the person seeping reimbursement <br />arose out of conduct that was reasonable under the circumstances, and involving the lawful <br />performance of the duties for the City. Even a violation of law, if unintentional, can be <br />reasonable. The key that we see is the knowledge of the official at the time of the conduct <br />involved. whether one looks at good faith or bad faith, willful neglect of duty, malfeasance in <br />office, or the phrase "reasonable and lawful," all of these things have an element of knowledge <br />e <br />within them. <br />
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