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July 27, 2003 Page Be Potential Conflicts Between State Statute and Code Provisions in Chapter 105. Municipalities have no inherent powers.3 They possess only such powers as are expressly conferred by statute or implied as necessary in aid of those powers which have been expressly conferred. See . . Mangold Midwest Co. v. yillajqe of Lichfield, 143 N.w. d 813 Minn. 1966). Thus a municipality, in order to justify the � enactment of an ordinance, must have the power to do so under the specific enabling legislation, or the power must implicitly exist as necessary in aid of the specific enumerated powers., Ordinances passed by a municipality which can find their basis in express or implied p F grants of authority are generally upheld, with the exception of the application of two doctrines that may be used to find ordinances, or a part of them,, invalid. One is the doctrine of preemption. The other is the doctrine called conflicts. Generally, the doctrine of conflict would render a municipal ordinance invalid as contrary to state law when the ordinance and statute contain express or implied terms that are ■ p irreconcilable. Either the ordinance permits what the statute forbids, or the ordinance forbids what the statute permits. Mangy, su . ra. Generally, no conflict exists between municipal ordinances and state statutes where the ordinance, though different, is merely additional and complimentary to, or in aid and furtherance of the statute. Chapter 10 5 of the Roseville Code appears, in our judgment, to be in conflict with Minn. Stat. § 465.76. Chapter 105 appears to allow, and in fact encourage, that which state law does net allow. The significant area of conflict relates to who makes a decision as to whether the costs of a criminal defense may be reimbursed to an y em p 10 ee or officer, Linder Minn. Stat. § 45 6.76, it is the governing body of a municipality that makes the .. decision as to whether costs and attorney's fees incurred by the person to defend charges of a .g criminal nature will be paid. This is a discretionary decision. What that means is that even if all of the requirements of the statute are met, by statute a municipalit y does not have to reimburse criminal defense expenses. Linder the statute, only when less than a quorum of the governing body is disinterested does a judge decide whether there shall be reimbursement 44 Chapter 105, with its attempt to incorporate Minn. Stat. § 317A,521 versus Minn. Stat. 465.76 as a standard for action, is structured in such a way as to otentiall tape the decision p y away from the City Council on a criminal reimbursement issues when in fact the Spec iffic statutory provision relating to reimbursement lays the decision makingsquarely at the feet of 3 prior to the passage of Minn. Stat, § 465.76, the Attorney General had rendered an opinion that there was no P ' lied � power of a municipality to pay or reirnburse an employee or officer for chin final defense expenses. Op. AtCy Gen. 124-A- 25 (July 2$, 1950). 4 Disinterested in this sense means that there is a non - pecuniary interest. See Dowell v. Board ofAd'ustrnent of the i of Moorhead, 446 N.W.2d 917 (Minn. App. 1989). .�