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<br />Mr. Neal Beets <br />June 17, 2004 <br />Page 2 of 5 <br /> <br />The term "general 'welfare" is broadly and liberally interpreted in ordinances that are <br />both regulatory and entirely local in scope. 1 A regulatory ordinance is one that controls an <br />activity; as opposed to an ordinance that prohibits the activity all together. 2 An ordinance <br />requiring the disclosure of campaign contributions is regulatory because it is a control on the <br />receipt of campaign contributions. At a minimum, the scope of an ordinance is local when the <br />effects of the ordinance do not extend outside the City limits.3 Since only residents of the City <br />may hold City office,4 the scope of an ordinance requiring candidates for City office to disclose <br />can1paign contIibutions is local because its effects are limited to those living within the City <br />limits. Therefore, such an ordinance is regulatory and entirely local in scope. <br /> <br />An ordinance that requires candidates for City office to disclose campaign contributions <br />greater than $100 protects the ability of City residents to be infonned of the financing that <br />supports a candidacy. The City Council has the power to adopt such an ordinance in providing <br />for the good government and general welfare of the City. <br /> <br />Effect of State Campaign Disclosure Requirements. A local ordinance is preempted <br />when State law leaves no room for the local regulation. The Minnesota Election LawS states <br />that candidates for public office must report contributions that, in the aggregate, are greater <br />than $500 in a year. The question is whether this State law preempts a City requirement that <br />candidates for City office disclose campaign contributions greater than $1 OO? The short <br />ans\ver is: No. <br /> <br />Local ordinances are preempted when a State law fully occupies the field on a subject <br />so that there is no room for local regulation, even when the local regulation does not directly <br />conflict with any provision of State law.6 Four factors are to be considered in determining <br />when preemption applies. Those factors are: <br /> <br />1. What is the "subject matter" which is to be regulated? <br />2. Has the subject matter been so fully covered by state la\v as to have become <br />solely a matter of state concern? <br />3. Has the legislature in partially regulating the subject matter indicated that it is a <br />matter solely of state concern? <br /> <br />I Village of Brooklyn Center v. Rippen, 96 N.W.2d 585 (Minn.1959); Naegele Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Village of <br />Jvfinnetonka, 162 N.W.2d 206 (Minn. 1968). <br />2 State v. Stone, 572 N.S.2d 725, 729 (Minn. 1997) quoting California v. Cabazon Band of Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 209 <br />(1987). <br />3 Rippen, Id.; In re Independent School District No. 38], in Lake County, 213 N.\V.2d 631,637-38 (Minn. 1973). <br />4 Minn. Stat. 9412.02. <br /> <br />5 Minnesota Statutes chapters 201, 202A, 203B, 204B, 204C, 204D, 205, 205A, 206, 208, 209, 21 lA, 211B, and 211C. <br /> <br />6 Mangold Midl1lest Co. v. Richfield, 143 N.W.2d 813,819 (Minn. 1966). <br />