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<br />May 3, 2006 <br />Page 3 of6 <br /> <br />punishments for the same offense are in violation of the double jeopardy clause, double <br />jeopardy rarely attaches to civil sanctions. See,~, United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 <br />(1989). It is only when a civil sanction cannot be characterized as remedial, but only as a <br />deterrent or retribution, that the double jeopardy clause may be invoked. It has been said in at <br />least one Minnesota case that a disciplinary sanction is remedial if it is rationally related to a <br />remedial goal. See In re Welfare ofE.R,G., 551 N.W.2d 238 (Minn. App. 1996). <br /> <br />Keep in mind that we are dealing with a civil sanction under the City Code sections in <br />question. City Code Section 302.15 indicates that it is dealing with a "civil penalty." This is <br />consistent with Minnesota law. Minn. Stat. :'l 340A.4l5 is the provision under which the city <br />has its authority to impose the penalties under Code Section 302.15. That statute clearly <br />indicates that it is dealing with civil penalties. Section 302.14 of the City Ordinance indicates <br />that the policy regarding liquor control is the interest of public welfare, which can be argued to <br />be a remedial goal. Under the analysis of the cases set forth above, since the disciplinary <br />sanction is rationally related to the remedial goal of public welfare, the civil penalty would not <br />be deemed to invoke the protections of the double jeopardy clause. Under this line of <br />authority, the double jeopardy argument would have no weight. <br /> <br />However, that is not the end of the issue. The principle of double jeopardy has been <br />used in other contexts, most often in employment disciplinary situations, to preclude multiple <br />punishments for the same action. For instance, in Skeim v. Independent School District No. <br />115,234 N.W.2d 806 (Minn. 1975), the court recognized the importation into labor arbitration <br />from criminal law of the concept of double jeopardy or "double punishment." The Skeim court <br />indicated that an employee could not be punished twice for the same incident. Other court and <br />arbitration decisions have used the principle of double jeopardy in overturning an employer's <br />decision to discipline twice for the same infraction. See,~, Hughes v. City of Saint Paul, <br />273 N.W.2d 618 (Minn. 1937); ISD No. 116 v. Individual Grievant, BMS Case No. 98-TD-13 <br />(Sept. 25, 1998). The courts have applied double jeopardy principles in other situations. For <br />example, the Minnesota Court of Appeals recognized the impropriety in the imposition of <br />multiple fines for a single act in the case onn the Matter of Residential Building Contractors <br />License of Beacon Builders, 1996 WL 175821 (Minn. App. 1996)(unpublished)(modifying an <br />award of civil penalties resting on improper double counting of violations). See also State v. <br />Schmitt, 429 N.W.2d 518 (Wis. App. 1988)(indicating a person cannot be subject to a double <br />forfeiture ifhis conduct constituted a single violation, even when that conduct is not <br />considered a crime). <br /> <br />The above cases are certainly not ones that deal with liquor code violations. They are <br />cited merely to show that double jeopardy arguments can be raised in the context of civil <br />penalty proceedings. I am not predicting that a double jeopardy argument would be successful <br />in precluding the City from revisiting the Code violations in question. However, neither am I <br />saying it could not be successful. It is merely one of the arguments that might be raised in the <br />case. And, there are some other arguments that might come into play. <br />