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May 3, 2006 Page 4 of6 Another argument that could possibly be raised deals with principal and agent relationships. In fact, if the City Council were to "revisit" the Code violations that were dealt with by Mr. Beets last fall, it would be attempting to disavow the action of the City Manager and say, in effect, that was not authorized and we are going to look at this ourselves. General principles of agency might preclude the City Council from taking such a stance. In general, an agent is a person who is authorized to act for a principal. Clearly, as a municipality, the City acts only through its agents. The City Manager is an agent of the City. In dealing with scope of authority of an agent, which often comes into play in cases, it is said that an agent acts within the scope of his or her authority ifhe or she has the express or implied authority to act for the employer. Implied authority to act can be determined by the course or pattern of dealing between the principal and agent. See,~, Hockemever v. Pooler, 130 N.W.2d 367 (1964); Derrick v. Drolson Co., 69 N.W.2d 124 (1955). This is where the reference to past practices of the City which gave rise to Mr. Beets' belief, which the conflict prosecutor indicated might be reasonably held, would come into play. In a very real sense, implied authority is that authority which is inferred from a course of dealing between the principal and the agent. Derrick, supra.; see also Schlick v. Berg, 286 N.W. 356 (Minn. 1939). Therefore, the argulnent that the City already acted once and C&">1not act again, Inay also be made not so much on the basis of double jeopardy but on the basis of the principal and agent relationship. While it is very similar to a double jeopardy argument, it is a separate theory that an entity might raise to preclude the City from acting again. Or certainly at least to suggest to an Independent Hearing Officer that the City is acting inappropriately in attempting to revisit the Code violation penalties. Ifa party were to attempt to disavow the acts of its agent, and then there was proved a pattern of practice which would show that agent had authority, that might very well tip the balance in a hearing officer's mind as to whether the hearing officer should apply double jeopardy principles. There are other theories that could be raised. One of them is estoppel. There are a number of various forms of estoppel that can apply. I am therefore not going to try to cite all the law and the various permutations of arguments that might arise under those various laws. However, simply and succinctly stated, estoppel arguments are raised when a party relies upon the other person's conduct, in taking some action to their detriment, that would make it unjust or unequitable to allow the other party to now change its position or make a certain argument given the earlier conduct and the detrimental reliance. In taking part in optional programs, and in effect, paying double the generally prescribed first offense fine (even if half of that doubled amount was deemed a charitable contribution), the liquor establishments in question could conceivably argue that there is some estoppel that should apply to an attempt to revisit the liquor code violations. Finally, the last theory that I could see a party raising in order to preclude a second look at the sanctions imposed last year for the violations in question is that of the doctrine of res judicata. Res judicata basically states that a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes