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WhileKinningestablishedasolidargumentforselectivecodeenforcementandrentallicensing,some <br />arguewhetherthiskindofpolicywillresultinrentincreases,particularlyforlowincometenantswho <br />aremorelikelytoliveinbuildingsthatarenotuptocode(Ackerman1971;Komesar1972).Inexamining <br />thefeasibilityofrentallicensingintheCityofMilwaukee,Crichton,Rosenberg,andThompson(2003), <br />alsoexpressedconcernabouttheunknowneffectsofrentallicensingonrentprices.Inresponse, <br />Kinningarguesrentallicensingprogramsallowmunicipalitiestointervenebeforearentalproperty <br />deterioratestoapointwhereexpensiverepairsareneeded,therebykeepingthebuildingincompliance <br />andreducingcoststolandlords/propertyowners.Potentially,whenarentallicensingprogramisinitially <br />enacted,theremaybeincreasedcostsforlandlordswhohavelettheirbuildingsfallintodisrepair,butin <br />thelongtermthecostsmaynotbemuchmorethanthecostofregularmaintenance. <br />OtherConsiderations <br />VulnerablePopulations <br />Roseville,inparticular,hasaconcentrationofarelativelynewimmigrantpopulationlivinginmulti <br />familyhousingbuildings.Ofparticularconcernisthevulnerabilityofthisgroup,whoareprimarily <br />refugeesandmaynotbeawareoftheirrightsastenantsormayfeartherepercussionsfrommaking <br />complaintsabouthousingconditionsagainstapropertyowner.Luna(2004),statesthat{;““·­xfears <br />ofretaliationfromlandlords,coupledwiththelackofalternativehousingeffectivelystiflescomplaints <br />oftenantswhoarewearyofpossibleeviction.Thiscombinationaccordinglyrequireshousingin <br />substandardinfrastructuresandsegregatedcommunities›œu|Thismeansthatselectivecode <br />enforcementcouldpotentiallyhaveadisproportionateeffectontenantsinthesetypesofbuildings. <br />Additionally,culturalnormsanddifferingdefinitionsoffamilycanmeanthatoccupancyordinancesin <br />particularmaybedifficulttoenforce(Krieger2008). <br />PropertyManagementandCrime <br />Concentrationofcrimeinparticularbuildingsisofconcerntomunicipalgovernments.Theconcernis <br />bothasocialoneandafiscalone.Notonlyisconcentratedcrimeapublicsafetyissue,italsomeans <br />thesepropertiesdisproportionatelyusepublicresourcesthroughrepeatedpoliceandfirecalls.A1999 <br />studybytheNationalInstituteofJusticedemonstratesthelinkbetweeneffectivepropertymanagement <br />andcrimereduction(Travis1999).Thisstudy,conductedwithpropertymanagersinSanDiego,Calif., <br />showedthattherewasasignificantreductionincrime,about60percent,onpropertieswhose <br />managersparticipatedinaninterventionprogram.Theprogramincludedaninitialinspectionofthe <br />propertyconductedbyacodeenforcementofficialandapolicedetective.Thisinspectionthen <br />producedaplanofactiontoreducecrimeonthepropertywithsupportfromlocalpolice.Theauthorsof <br />thisstudydo,however,pointouttwoimportantfactorsthatcanaffecthowresponsiveproperty <br />managersaretothesetypesofinterventions.Thefirstisthestrengthoftherentalmarket.Iftherental <br />marketisweakandpropertyownersareonthevergeofabandoningtheirproperties,thentheyhave <br />littleincentivetoparticipate.Ifthemarketisstrong,thenpropertyownersmayhavegreaterincentives <br />tomaketheirpropertiesmoreappealingtorenterssincetheywillbeabletocollecthigherrents.The <br />8 <br /> <br />