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Ross(1995)describestheusefulnessofpropertymaintenancecodesandtheroleofhousinginspectors <br />innegotiatingcompliancewithlandlords.AccordingtoRoss,housinginspectorshaveseveraltoolsat <br />theirdisposalforthisnegotiation.Thefirsttoolistheexistinghousingandpropertymaintenancecode. <br />Rosssuggeststhatbecausepropertymaintenancecodesoftenusebroadandvaguelanguage, <br />inspectorscanusetheirdiscretioninenforcement.Typically,apropertyownerwhoconsistently <br />demonstratesunwillingnesstocomplywithrepairorderswillbegivenlessleniencyfromtheinspectors. <br />Ontheotherhand,inspectorswilltendtobemorelenientandunderstandingofpropertyownerswho <br />areconsistentlycooperative.Thesecondtoolistheabilitytoimposefinesforrepeatedviolationswhen <br />apropertyownerisnotcompliant.Theabilitytoimposefines,however,variesinmunicipalities,Kinning <br />(1993)additionallystatesthattoooftenlandlordsviewnoncompliancefeesaspartofdoingbusiness <br />andcontinuetopayfeesinsteadofmakingmorecostlyrepairs.Kennedy(1987)andKinning(1993) <br />suggestthatselectivecodeenforcementisaviablesolutiontothisproblem. <br />SelectiveCodeEnforcementandRentalLicensing <br />ThoughMeyers(1975)wrotethatstrictercodeenforcementwouldleadtoabandonmentandreduction <br />ofthehousingstock,Kinning(1993)suggeststhatthisisnotthecasewhencodeenforcementworksto <br />encourageachangeofownership.Hedescribesthreetypesofchronicallynoncompliantlandlords:the <br />debtriddenlandlord,theincompetentlandlord,andthesociopathiclandlord.Thefirsttwotypesof <br />landlords7š“x·maintainbuildingswellormakeneededrepairsduetoalackofcapacity.Thethirdtype, <br />hedescribes,asociopathiclandlord,isonewho{-š“­z­·;“·Œäevadesorderstorepairbydelayingthe <br />extensionprocessandeventuallypayingonlysmallfinesthatdonotreflectthetruecostofrepair.On <br />therareoccasionthatheactuallyrepairssomething,heusuallymakestherepairinsuchahastyand <br />unprofessionalmannerthatitquicklybreaksagain.Herarely,ifever,hireslicensedcontractorstomake <br />repairs› <br /> <br />Kinningarguesthatforallthreetypes,selectivecodeenforcementwouldencouragea <br />changeofownershipthatwouldactuallybenefittenantsandneighborhoods. <br />Yz““z“mx­researchdetailstheestablishmentofarentallicensingand{w;¦;·OffenderCodeCompliance <br />Initiative›wh//Lœ|inMinneapolis,Minn.Therentallicensingprogramprohibitspropertyownersfrom <br />rentingresidentialpropertieswithoutregisteringwiththecityandsubmittingtoperiodicinspections. <br />TheRepeatOffenderCodeComplianceInitiativeidentifiedpropertyownerswhodemonstratedthe <br />mostegregiousandcontinuingbehavior.Landlordswhofallintothiscategoryaresubjecttojailtime <br />insteadofcivilpenaltiesfornoncompliance.AccordingtoKinning,rentallicensingpreventsrepeat <br />offendersfromcontinuingtomilktheirpropertiesbythreateningtorevokethelicense,whichwilllead <br />tolossofrevenue.InMinneapolis,thispolicyhasresultedinareductionoftenantcomplaintsabout <br />housingqualityofpropertiesownedbyROCCIlandlordssince1990.Theselectivecodeenforcement <br />conceptmeantthatadditionalinspectorsdidnotneedtobehiredsinceinspectionsfortheROCCI <br />programfocusonproblemproperties.Kinningalsosuggeststhatgainingcooperationfromproperty <br />ownerswheneverpossibleismorecosteffectivethanlitigation.Incaseswherethereisapersistent <br />problemwithaparticularpropertyorlandlord,however,gainingcooperationmaynotbefeasible, <br />especiallywithoutsomekindofleverage.Kinningbelievesthatselectivecodeenforcementandrental <br />licensingcanprovidetheleveragecitiesneedtogetbuildingsintocompliance. <br />7 <br /> <br />