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'~: <br />.... <br /> <br />\ <br /> <br />';r <br /> <br />288 Minn. <br /> <br />552 NORTH WESTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES <br /> <br />1980) (footnote omitted). The McShane en- <br />terprise function analysis applies only when a <br />"specific governmental enterprise takes an <br />effective easement." Thompson, 455 N.W.2d <br />at 517. <br /> <br />[8] Arcadia's governmental enterprise ar- <br />gument is based on its claim that the City's <br />1963 rezoning decision and the resulting in- <br />crease in property taxes were part of a clear <br />policy by the City to eliminate Collins Park <br />so that the property could be put to a higher <br />real estate tax generating use. The issue, is <br />not whether the City's actions since 1963 <br />evidence a governmental enterprise, but <br />whether the ordinance waz designed specifi- <br />cally to benefit a governmental enterprise or <br />take an effective easement, such as the mu- <br />nicipal airport in McShane, 292 N.W.2d at <br />258. We cannot conclude that an easement <br />has been taken or that the ordinance ~ <br />designed to benefit a specific governmental <br />enterprise. <br /> <br />II. <br />[9] When legislation is not based on a <br />suspect class and does not infringe on a <br />fundamental right, it need only be rationally <br />related to a legitimate governmental purpose <br />in order to withstand federal equal protection <br />or substantive due process challenges. See <br />Federal Communications Comm'n v. Beach <br />Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 113 <br />S.Ct. 2096, 2101, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993); <br />Usery v. Turner Elklwm Mining Co., 428 <br />U.S. 1, 15, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 2892, 49 L.Ed.2d <br />752 (1976) (legislation adjusting burdens and <br />benefits of economic life presumed constitu- <br />tional and burden on challenger to establish <br />legislature acted arbitrarily or iITationally). <br />Legislation will fail rational basis review only <br />when it rests on grounds irrelevant to the <br />achievement of a plausible governmental ob- <br />jective. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 323, 113 <br />S.Ct. 2637, 2645, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993). <br /> <br />[10] Essentially the same analysis and <br />standa.rQs apply under the Minnesota Consti- <br />tution. Legislation is constitutional so long <br />as it serves to promote a public purpose; is <br />not an unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious <br /> <br />3. As previously noted, the legislative history of <br />the 1987 t;nabling statute, fully explains the pecu- <br /> <br />interference with a private interest; and the <br />means chosen bear a rational relation to the <br />public purpose sought to be served. Gruss- <br />ing v. Kvam Implement Co., 478 N.W.2d 200 <br />202 (Minn.App.1991). ' <br /> <br />[11] Because the ordinance substantially <br />advances a legitimate governmental purpose <br />under the takings analyses, it satisfies this <br />deferential rational basis test for equal pro- <br />tection and substantive due process pur- <br />poses. See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, <br />113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given that employer's due <br />process arguments are unavailing, "it would <br />be surprising indeed to discover" that legisla- <br />tion nonetheless violates takings clause); see <br />also Minnesota v. CWver Leaf Creamery Co., . <br />449 U.S. 456, 470 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 715, 727 n. <br />12, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) (if legislation does <br />not violate equal protection, it does not vio- <br />late substantive due process either); Skeen v. <br />State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 312 (Minn.1993) (stan- <br />dard applied to claims brought under state <br />equal protection clause same as that applied <br />to claims brought under fedel"cU equal protec- <br />tion clause); State v. Morrow, 492 N.W.2d <br />539, 547 (Minn.App.1992) (constitutional chal- <br />lenge under either due process or equal pro- <br />tection of federal or state constitutions raise <br />similar questions). <br /> <br />Arcadia questions the ''real'' or "actual" <br />motives for the ordinance and insists that the <br />ordinance is ''irrational,'' presumably because <br />the City could have done more to protect <br />park owners' private financial interests. Ar- <br />cadia asserts that a remand is necessary for <br />a trial on precisely what the City meant in <br />the preamble of the ordinance by the refer- <br />ence to "the peculiar nature and problems <br />presented by closure or conversion of manu- <br />factured home parks." 3 In doing so, Arcadia <br />attempts improperly to shift the burden to <br />prove the constitutionality of the ordinance <br />onto the City. <br /> <br />[12-14] Arcadia further criticizes the <br />City for failing to make written findings in <br />support of its decision to adopt the ordi- <br />nance. See Honn v. City of Coon Rapids, <br />313 N.W.2d 409, 416 (Minn.1981) (municipali- <br />ties should prepare contemporaneous find- <br /> <br />\' <br />f <br /> <br />r <br />~ <br /> <br />1 <br />r <br /> <br />." 0" <br /> <br /><. <br /> <br />., <br /> <br /> <br />liar nature and problems associated with closure <br />of a mobile home park. <br />