<br />
<br />. 1
<br />~f,
<br />, ""ltI
<br />. .
<br />; . ,~
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />. .1 ;
<br />. -
<br />
<br />
<br />
<br />:1' ;
<br />f'
<br />'" ~
<br />r .
<br />..
<br />" t
<br />j-'
<br /><- '.' r
<br />";' (
<br />, l'
<br />'.:!. ..:efI. :
<br /><' - ~
<br />.> . .
<br />, ,
<br />1 "l''t
<br />;I~ J~
<br />
<br />. I ~;. ..
<br />-. '{1
<br />1,; ."
<br />~-:4;:
<br />'. ,:~":
<br />
<br />
<br />~'
<br />
<br />A:.&~; .
<br />1'/'
<br />,,'
<br />;.&,,:
<br />;~tt
<br />'ii'
<br />~i'
<br />;;:,:~
<br />~:~'t
<br />;6. ~
<br />;r~
<br />::ie" ~.
<br />;jJ:
<br />~~.
<br />...",
<br />~+.~
<br />~7
<br />~:
<br />:~~;
<br />~~~~
<br />~r
<br />~j:'
<br />~:;'(;'.
<br />~.~~~
<br />'t;.l\
<br />;~~'.~'~
<br />~t
<br />~~t'
<br />t~.\:
<br />
<br />~~:'~.
<br />
<br />;1.._
<br />
<br />;.'''::
<br />
<br />>:;;0',_
<br />r ';~
<br />. '.
<br />C.f
<br />~. '~:
<br />....
<br />
<br />\
<br />
<br />';r
<br />
<br />288 Minn.
<br />
<br />552 NORTH WESTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES
<br />
<br />1980) (footnote omitted). The McShane en-
<br />terprise function analysis applies only when a
<br />"specific governmental enterprise takes an
<br />effective easement." Thompson, 455 N.W.2d
<br />at 517.
<br />
<br />[8] Arcadia's governmental enterprise ar-
<br />gument is based on its claim that the City's
<br />1963 rezoning decision and the resulting in-
<br />crease in property taxes were part of a clear
<br />policy by the City to eliminate Collins Park
<br />so that the property could be put to a higher
<br />real estate tax generating use. The issue, is
<br />not whether the City's actions since 1963
<br />evidence a governmental enterprise, but
<br />whether the ordinance waz designed specifi-
<br />cally to benefit a governmental enterprise or
<br />take an effective easement, such as the mu-
<br />nicipal airport in McShane, 292 N.W.2d at
<br />258. We cannot conclude that an easement
<br />has been taken or that the ordinance ~
<br />designed to benefit a specific governmental
<br />enterprise.
<br />
<br />II.
<br />[9] When legislation is not based on a
<br />suspect class and does not infringe on a
<br />fundamental right, it need only be rationally
<br />related to a legitimate governmental purpose
<br />in order to withstand federal equal protection
<br />or substantive due process challenges. See
<br />Federal Communications Comm'n v. Beach
<br />Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 113
<br />S.Ct. 2096, 2101, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993);
<br />Usery v. Turner Elklwm Mining Co., 428
<br />U.S. 1, 15, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 2892, 49 L.Ed.2d
<br />752 (1976) (legislation adjusting burdens and
<br />benefits of economic life presumed constitu-
<br />tional and burden on challenger to establish
<br />legislature acted arbitrarily or iITationally).
<br />Legislation will fail rational basis review only
<br />when it rests on grounds irrelevant to the
<br />achievement of a plausible governmental ob-
<br />jective. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 323, 113
<br />S.Ct. 2637, 2645, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993).
<br />
<br />[10] Essentially the same analysis and
<br />standa.rQs apply under the Minnesota Consti-
<br />tution. Legislation is constitutional so long
<br />as it serves to promote a public purpose; is
<br />not an unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious
<br />
<br />3. As previously noted, the legislative history of
<br />the 1987 t;nabling statute, fully explains the pecu-
<br />
<br />interference with a private interest; and the
<br />means chosen bear a rational relation to the
<br />public purpose sought to be served. Gruss-
<br />ing v. Kvam Implement Co., 478 N.W.2d 200
<br />202 (Minn.App.1991). '
<br />
<br />[11] Because the ordinance substantially
<br />advances a legitimate governmental purpose
<br />under the takings analyses, it satisfies this
<br />deferential rational basis test for equal pro-
<br />tection and substantive due process pur-
<br />poses. See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640,
<br />113 S.Ct. at 2289 (given that employer's due
<br />process arguments are unavailing, "it would
<br />be surprising indeed to discover" that legisla-
<br />tion nonetheless violates takings clause); see
<br />also Minnesota v. CWver Leaf Creamery Co., .
<br />449 U.S. 456, 470 n. 12, 101 S.Ct. 715, 727 n.
<br />12, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981) (if legislation does
<br />not violate equal protection, it does not vio-
<br />late substantive due process either); Skeen v.
<br />State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 312 (Minn.1993) (stan-
<br />dard applied to claims brought under state
<br />equal protection clause same as that applied
<br />to claims brought under fedel"cU equal protec-
<br />tion clause); State v. Morrow, 492 N.W.2d
<br />539, 547 (Minn.App.1992) (constitutional chal-
<br />lenge under either due process or equal pro-
<br />tection of federal or state constitutions raise
<br />similar questions).
<br />
<br />Arcadia questions the ''real'' or "actual"
<br />motives for the ordinance and insists that the
<br />ordinance is ''irrational,'' presumably because
<br />the City could have done more to protect
<br />park owners' private financial interests. Ar-
<br />cadia asserts that a remand is necessary for
<br />a trial on precisely what the City meant in
<br />the preamble of the ordinance by the refer-
<br />ence to "the peculiar nature and problems
<br />presented by closure or conversion of manu-
<br />factured home parks." 3 In doing so, Arcadia
<br />attempts improperly to shift the burden to
<br />prove the constitutionality of the ordinance
<br />onto the City.
<br />
<br />[12-14] Arcadia further criticizes the
<br />City for failing to make written findings in
<br />support of its decision to adopt the ordi-
<br />nance. See Honn v. City of Coon Rapids,
<br />313 N.W.2d 409, 416 (Minn.1981) (municipali-
<br />ties should prepare contemporaneous find-
<br />
<br />\'
<br />f
<br />
<br />r
<br />~
<br />
<br />1
<br />r
<br />
<br />." 0"
<br />
<br /><.
<br />
<br />.,
<br />
<br />
<br />liar nature and problems associated with closure
<br />of a mobile home park.
<br />
|