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IES iva~ interest; and the . rational relation to the to be served. Gr"lt8~_ 'It Co., 478 N.W.2d 200 , >rdinance sUbstantially governmental purpose uyses, it satisfies this sis test for equal pro- ve due process pur- ~ipe, 508 U.S. at 640 ,n that employer's du~ ! unavailing, "it would discover" that legis la- !s takings clause); see ItT Leaf Creame/"y Co., , 101 S.Ct. 715, i2i n. 91) (if legislation does ction, it does not \10- Icess either); Skeen v. 312 (Minn.1993) (stan. brought under state same as that applied . federal equal protec- M01'1'CnO, 492 K.W.2d n (constitutional chal- process or equal pro- .te constitutions raise e "real" or "actual" e and insists that the , presumably because me more to protect ancial interests. Ar- land is necessary for Lt the City meant in linance by the refer- ature and problems conversion of manu- In doing so, Arcadia shift the burden to :ty of the ordinance ther criticizes the written findings in - to adopt -the ordi- ty of Coon "Rapids. m.1981) (municipali. temporaneous find- ISsociated with closure .{ ~ ~ -. ARCADIA DEVELOP. v. CITY OF BLOOMINGTON Clteu552 N.W.2d 281 (MJnn..App. 1996) to support any zoning decision, whether 789 (Minn.1989) (statute "survives e~ual ~ro- ~tive or quasi-judicial). This is not a tection and due process challenges" if ration- cbIllenge to a zoning decision, b~t to the ally related to legitimate government objec- Otis adoption and enforcement of an ordi- tive). We refuse to add this third prong to. aance- Legislative bodies generally are not our analysis. required to articulate reasons for enacting a statute or ordinance. United States R.R. ~t Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179, 101 S.Ct. 453, 461, 66 L.Ed.2d 368 (1980). Even when those reasons are articulated, a reviewing court must assume those reasons are the actual purposes of the legislation. Su Clever Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. at 464, 101 S.Ct. at 724. The rational basis test merely requires the challenged legislation to be supported by any set. of facts either known or which could reasonably be as- sumed. United States v. Carotene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153-54, 58 S.Ct. 778, 784, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938); United States v. Os- ~rn. 955 F.2d 1500, 1505 (11th Cir.1992) ("any rationale Congress 'could' have had for enacting the statute can validate the legisla- tion, regardless of whether Congress actua11y considered that rationale at the time the bill was passed"), em denied, 506 U.S. 878, 113 S.Ct. 223, 121 L.Ed.2d 160 (1992). Arcadia finally asserts that the district court erred in rejecting the substantive due process analysis adopted by the Washington Supreme Court in Guimont, 854 P.2d at 14. [n Guimont, the court acknowledged that the state has a legitimate interest in addressing the state- wide problem of relocation expenses asso- ciateJ with mobile home park closings. Making funds available to mobile home owners who are forced to relocate substan- tially advances that interest. Id. The court nevertheless added. a third prong to the substantive due process analysis and concluded that the ordinance was uncon- stitutional because it was "unduly oppres- sive" on the landowner. Id. at 16. The United States and Minnesota Supreme. Court.<; do not currently require an examina- tion of whether economic legislation is "undu- ly oppressive." See Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 640, 113 S.Ct. at 2289 (imposition of with- drawal liability rationally related to terms of employer's participation in plan it joined and "that suffices for substantive due process scrutiny of this economic legislation"); Sny- der v. City of Minneapolis, 441 N.W.2d 781, Minn. 289 III. [15] Mildred Collins argues that she has pled sufficiently egregious facts to sustain her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. She claimed that the ordinance was enacted in direct response to her efforts to sell Collins Park. She insists that the City was protecting its own self-interests by re- quiring her to shoulder the full responsibility for displaced residents' relocation costs. She further insists ~at the ordinance was fully supported by the mayor of the City at the time, who was in a close mayoral race and who realized that if Collins Park closed there would be many dissatisfied potential voters. Mildred. Collins insists that the City and the mayor acted in a self-interested manner, solely at her expense. Intentional infliction of emotional distress is limited to cases involving "particularly egregious facts." Those facts must evidence conduct "so atrocious that it passes the boundaries of decency and is utterly intoler- able to the civilized community." Hubbard v. United Press Int7, 330 N.W.2d 428, 439 (Minn.1983) (citation omitted). Even assum- ing the facts alleged by Mildred Collins are true, we cannot conclude that the conduct of the City rises to this extreme level Cf. Venes v. Professional Servo Bureau, Inc., 353 N.W.2d 671 (Minn.App.1984) (jury could find outrageous or egregious conduct occurred when collection agency called consumer/debt- or, who was suffering from cancer, a "dead- beat" and warned him to "stay out of Minne- sota if you know what's good for you and your family"). DECISION The district court's grant of summary judgment to the City on all of Arcadia and Mildred Collins's claims is affirmed. Affirmed.