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<br />6-23
<br />
<br />PROCEDURES
<br />
<br />~ 6.03[5]
<br />
<br />are meant to protect and preserve adjacent property and the larger
<br />neighborhood.
<br />The imposition of conditions is not totally discretionary. Condi-
<br />tions must be in proper form and substantively valid. Chief among
<br />the substantive requirements are that the conditions serve a
<br />legitimate zoning objective and be clearly and specifically stated so
<br />as to inform the property owner of the particular limitations placed
<br />on the property's use.117 Vaguely stated conditions will be invalidat-
<br />ed.118 Thus, the applicant's public hearing statement cannot be
<br />incorporated by reference as conditions.119
<br />A board of zoning appeals cannot indiscriminately impose condi-
<br />tions, regardless of whether they are properly stated. The conditions
<br />must relate to zoning objectives12o and be directed at the property
<br />rather than the property's owner.121 Thus, conditions shown to
<br />protect the community's health, safety and welfare are proper,
<br />while conditions which bear no relation to such goals are considered
<br />improper. These objectives are broad enough to allow conditions
<br />related to aesthetic considerations and neighborhood property
<br />values.122
<br />As mentioned, conditions which do not serve a valid zoning
<br />purpose are invalid. Given the breadth of valid zoning objectives,
<br />however, this is rarely a point of contention. More typically,
<br />
<br />v. Pastan, 1 Mass. App. 28,294 N.E.2d .501 (1973); Sea View Cliffs, Inc. v. Zoning
<br />Bd. of Review, 112 R.I. 314,309 A.2d 20 (1973); Everson Elec. Co. v. Zoning Bd. of
<br />Adjustment, 395 Pa. 168, 149 A.2d 63 (1959); In re Appeal ofBd. of Supervisors, 49
<br />Pa. Commw. 267, 412 A.2d 163 (1980).
<br />116 Nicholson v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 392 Pa. 278, 140 A.2d 604 (1958);
<br />Carter v. City of Nashua, 113 N.H. 407,308 A.2d 847 (1973); Lugar v. Burnsville,
<br />295 N.W.2d 609 (Minn. 1980).
<br />117Town of Warren v. Frost, 115 R.I. .'517, 3.50 A.2d 608 (1976); Appeal of
<br />Farrell v. Desautels, Inc., 135 Vt. 614, 383 A.2d 619 (1978); Conmar Builders, Inc.
<br />v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 43 Misc. 2d 577, 251 N.Y.S.2d 521 (1964).
<br />118 Pearson v. Shoemaker, 25 Misc. 2d 591, 202 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1960); Taft v.
<br />Zoning Bd. of Review, 76 R.I. 443, 71 A.2d 886 (19.50).
<br />119 Rochester Historical Soc'y v. Crowley, 14 A.D.2d 490,217 N.Y.S.2d 619
<br />(1961); Appeal of Farrell v. Desautels, Inc., 13.5 Vt. 614, 383 A.2d 619 (1978).
<br />120 See supra note 114.
<br />121 Wentworth Hotel, Inc. v. New Castle, 112 N.H. 21, 287 A.2d 61.5 (1972);
<br />National Black Child Dev. Inst. v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment,
<br />483 A.2d 687 (D.C. Ct. App. 1984) (invalidating condition applied to specific
<br />corporation); St. Onge v. Donovan, ,511 N.Y.S.2d 700 (App. Div. 1987).
<br />122 Everson Elec. Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 39.'5 Pa. ] 68, 149 A.2e1 63
<br />(19.59); Nicholson v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 392 Pa. 278, 140 A.2d 604 (1958);
<br />Wentworth Hotel, Inc. v. New Castle, 112 N.H. 21, 287 A.2d 61.5 (1972).
<br />
<br />(Release #4, 3jfJO)
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