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• JAN-06-2003 1s:~ JfA`f-'UO'CCJYJJ 1`1'LJ Mr. Neal Beets Stutuary 6, 20Q3 Page 4 of 6 CITY-OF-R0.SEVILLE-ADMIN 1'CH i W l t\ RUJLt~gl t'~pILI.AgF', r 6514902276 P. 11/12 b1GJJ710q,?ty r. 1e Finally, rescrictians on the use of facilities must leave open ample alternative channels of Colrifriuttication. The basic test ie whether the speaker is worded "a forum that is accessible and where the intended audience is expected to pass." Students Against Av'artbeid Coalition v. O'Neil, 660 F. Supp. 333, 339 (W.D. Va.19g'7}. A sunilar analysis rxrould apply to any ordinance that appears neutral on its face, but operates in such a way as to deny access to City facilities to one particular soup. As stated above, any rtestxictions on the use of Cif meeting tat~ilities must be content neutral, Analytically, there are two aspecL~ to the principle of content neutrality: viewpoint neutrality and category neutrality. This means that the City cannot regulate meeting room use so as to favor one viewpoint over another, and cannot discrizr~inate bet~-een different categories of expression, regardless ofwhether the restriction on facility nee is presented as a facially neutral regulation. Under the category of viewpoint neutrality, to which the Supreme Court lass reGOgaized no e~cceptions, the government cannot regulate expression in such a wary as to favor one viewpoint over another. So, for cxaznple, a city could not allow aces to Republicans while denying access to Democrats. Knits of tie Ku flux II~:llan v. Matttin Luther King Jr. ~oxshiooers, 735 F.Supp. 745 (M.b. Tenn. 1990), A,s the Supreme Court has stated, viewpoint discrimination is "an egregious form of content discrimination." Rosenberger v: Rector ~ Yisztors 4~'the Uniy_ of Virginia, S I S U'.S. 819, 829 (1995). The government `5must Abstain fin regulating speech when the spocific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective ofthe speaker iS the rationale for the restriction." j~. Under the frarnowork of category neutrality, government cannot generally regulate in such s way as to discriminate against different categories of expression. Et-momilc v. City of Jacl~sonyille. 422 U.S. 2b5 (1975}. For example, a city mould z~ot pass an ordinance limiting access to meeting faeilitae5 to only non-political Broups, even if the ordinance operated to limit the access of groups with a variety of different political ~viewpoiata. Finally, a city cannot regulate and organization's message by charging different fees to different groups for use of city facilities. If a city charges a fee for use of city property to hold a meeting, this fee must be the same afox all or~izatioxts wishing to use the property. Forsyth County v. Nationalist ~f~m~t, SOS U.S. 123 (1992) (rejecting a permit scheme where the fee for police protection could be increased if rho speaker was likely to generate controversy.) IT. Under The City's Current ~'seii[ity Use ~o1ic,, ~f ,A. Cam~euu~aity G~raup Uses ~i City Meeti~ Room, C~ The Group ~zclude Members Of The Public From (1) Attending The hleetittg, And/Or (Z) Joining The Organization? Park and Recreation operating Policy No. lOF governs the use of City facilities. In its purpose statement, the Policy indicates that `°Ihe City ofRoseville maintains facilities for the