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��c� �linn. 563 NORTH WESTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES construction appropriate only when statute is ambiguous). The inclusion of the de�iL�oa of finalist is a lcey consideration; it indicates that the triggering event that malces a name public is the sedection of a candidate to be interviewed, not the candidate's acquiescence to the interview. To hoEd otherwise would give the candidate control over when his or her name is made public. The statute does not contemplate such a result. The statute's legislative histoiy supports our decision. The italicized language was added to the statute during the 1981 legisla- tive session. 1981 Minn. Laws ch. 311, § 12. }� originally introduced in the Senate, the amendment did not inelude the definition of "�inalis�." See 1 1981 Minn. Senate Journal 966. When the definition was added, it was initially worded so that a"finalist" was "an individual who is interviezced *•*:' Id (emphasis added). Before being passed by the House, the definition was altered so that a"�inalist" was "an individual who is selected to be interviewed '*'." See 2 M�nn. House Journa13404 (emphasisadded). The legisla- ture's addition of the definition of "finalist" as welt as the "selected to be" clause indi- cates an intent that the identities of finalists are to be made public when the appointing authority chooses them for interviews, not when the candidates agree to go forward with the interviews. We recognize that the privacy concerns of applicants for public employment are at stalce, but the statute and its legislative his- tory suggest that the public's right to be informed outweighs an individual's privacy right in this context. We believe that the eaneerns raised by respondents can be ad- dressed if the appointing authority advises candidates before they apply (or early in the �r.SYelir.-, �r�! ti� � L4�rF �e� eeLst[�d t� be inten�lev�ed � _ �I I ��G� �# �4 finalists under the statute and their names may be made public during the selection process. Respondents' failure to disclose the candidates' names violated statutory require- ments. Therefore, we reverge the district court's decision on this issue. IT, [2J Appellant next argues that respon- dents violated the Open Meeting Law by conducting serial one-on-one inLert�iews, '� l�w provides with few exceptions that all meetings, including executive sessions, of "'* the governing body of any •*. city *•* and of any committee, subeom_ mittee, board, department or eo►nrriission� thereof, shall be open to the public "•■ Minn.Stat. � 471.705, subd. 1 (�998). '�},t purpose of the statute is to (1} prohibit seeret meetings that malce it impossible for -h� public to become fully informed. t 21 ass� the public's right to information, and (3)�,� the public an opportunity to espress its views. Claude v. Collins, 515 N.W2d 836, $41 (Minn.1994?. The Open Meeting Law was enacted to benefit the public and must be construed in the public's favor. See id Although the statute does not define "meeting," the supreme court has held that meetings subject to the requirements � the Open Meeting Law are gatherings of a quorum or more members of the governing body, or a quorttm �' a committee, subcommittee, board. depart- ment, or commission thereof, at wlrich members discuss, decide, or receive infar- mation aa a group on issues relating to the official business of that governing baly. MoBerg �. Independent Sch Dist. So. 28i, 336 N.W.Zd 510, 515 (Minn.1983). Applying this rule, the district court reasoned that when the city council conducted the one-on- one interviews, there was never a"meeting" of a quorum of the council. The court crnr cluded that the interview process "may bave violated the spirit of the Open Meeting Law. but technically the procedure did not violate the mitten statute." [3� The district court also recognized that determining whether the Open Meeting Law was violated requires more than merely a�r plying the "quorum rule," and cited the cau- tion of the Mobe�g court that serial meetings in groups of less than a quorum for the purposes of avoiding public hearings or fashioning agreement on ai issue may also be found to be a violationof the statute denendin¢ uoon the tljcta of the individual case.