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E�� Document 12 <br />Smoke-Free Restaurant Ordinances Dio Not Affecf <br />Restaurant Business. Period. <br />■ <br />THE STORY has becometediously <br />familiar: aconcemedlegislatoror <br />group of citizens decides that i t i s <br />timeto pass a local clean indoorair ordi- <br />nance to protect the public and woricers <br />from the toxins in secondhand tobacco <br />smoke.'� After mustering the scientific <br />w id e n ce that secondhand smoke causes <br />heart disease,-cancer, sudden infant <br />death, asthma, and a variety of other <br />problems, public health advocates ap- <br />proach the city council or other legisla- <br />tive bodyto act Shortlythereafter, a con- <br />cemed restaurant association sidesteps <br />the issue that secondhand smoke is dan- <br />gerous and produces a'stucl�!' claiming <br />that the result will be economic chaos, <br />with 20-40 percent drops in restaurant <br />business. Ps time passes, local tobacco <br />control adv�ocates or the media force the <br />restaurantassociation to admitthat it're- <br />quested and received some support." <br />Often, it ultimately comes out that the <br />tobacco industry or one of its public rela- <br />tions firmss organizedthe'restaurant asr <br />sociation" (Figure 1). After a long debate, <br />the ordinancepasses.4-' <br />After Glantz and Smith'�-" published <br />their study demonstrating that smoke- <br />iree restaurant ordinances have no effect <br />on restaurant revenues in the first 15 cit- <br />�� R work was supported in part by Na- <br />tional �pilnstitute grantCA-61027, <br />and a gift from FGlith and Henry Everett <br />Address for correspondence: <br />Stamton A. C�a�tz. PhD <br />Professor of Medicine <br />Box 0130 <br />University of California <br />Sazx Francisco, CA. 94143-0130 <br />Telephone: 415-476-3893 <br />F� 415-476-0424 <br />�mail: glantr.(a�medicine.ucsf.edu <br />Stanton A. Glantz, PhD <br />ies to pass such ordinances, the tobacco <br />andustry's claims of economicchaas lost <br />credibility, particularlyin Califomiaand <br />Colorado, where the cities were located. <br />While this study was also useful to adva <br />cates in other states (includingthase in <br />New Yorlcand Massachusetts�, the indus- <br />try started to argue that there was som� <br />-thing unique about California or Colo- <br />rado and, wh'ile there might not have <br />been economic chaas there; it would <br />happen elsewhere. The articles in this is- <br />sue of the Journal of Public Health Marr <br />agement and Practice �PHMP) show <br />that, i n contrastto claims by the tobacco <br />industry, smoke-free restaurant ordi- <br />nances have had no impact on revenues <br />after New Yor1c City and several commu- <br />nities in Massachusetts passed such ordi- <br />nances. <br />With the addition ofthe articles in this <br />issue ofJPHMP, there are now published <br />��a'4"•'¢" on the economic impact of <br />smoking restrictions on restaurant sales <br />for 81 localities in six sfates, 67 of which <br />are 100 percent smoke-ireei n restaurants <br />(Appendix 1). While there are some dif- <br />ferences i n the ordinances and the meth- <br />ods used to study them aa�ss localities, <br />all have relied on objectivesales tax data <br />to � economic impa� The salestax <br />data from these �� localities are consis- <br />tent in demonstratingthat ordinances re- <br />strictine �mokinE in estaurants have no <br />efFect on revenues. <br />� Studies of economic impact based on <br />sales tax rwenues have several advan- <br />tages. �rs#,, and most important, the data <br />are objective. They are collected by tax <br />authorities with no interest i n the impact <br />of a clean indoor air ordinance. Seoond, <br />they are complete; they include all resr <br />taurants. Third, they are available ov�er <br />time, so it is possibleto adjust for under- <br />Cr1 <br />lying economic trerxls ar seasonal vari- <br />ability. The problem with studies of the <br />impact of clean indoor air ordinances <br />based on sales tax data is thatthey are not <br />available until well after an ordinance <br />passes. TYxas, when confronted with�r� <br />clictions of disaster based � industry-�n- <br />spired surveys of the city i n question, ad- <br />vocates can only pointto evidence from <br />other cities. <br />The appropriate response to such pre- <br />dictionsiromthetobacco industryand its <br />allies and front groups is to point out that <br />these claims have been made every- <br />where else and. when the �i�Gm� aata <br />� <br />became available a vear ar two later, <br />they tumed out to be wronq. <br />Faced with the growing widence that <br />restaurant ordinances do not affecf rev- <br />enues, the tobacco industry has fallen <br />backonaseriesofsecondaryclaims, that <br />the public wil I not comply with the ordi- <br />nance or that it will somehow hurt err� <br />ployment or tourism (wen though rev <br />enues are not affec�ec�. Other articles in <br />this issue of JPHMPaIso debunk thes� <br />claims. Indeed, New Yor1c City added <br />restaurant jobs faster than the rest of the <br />state afterthe ordinance went into effed. <br />As already demonstrated i n other <br />places,"^�'the publicsupports and com- <br />plies with these ordinances. <br />TY�ese resulGs are not surprising, given <br />growing pu blic awareness of the dangers <br />of secondhand srrioke. Indeed, despite a <br />major public relations campaign de- <br />signed to undermine i� the public sup- <br />Stanton A�jvr��, Ph7J, is a Profes- <br />sor of Medicine at the Institutefor <br />Health Policy Stud ies and Depart- <br />ment af Medicine, Uruversity of Cali- <br />fornia, San F�ncisco, California. <br />