2005-01-27_AgendaPacket - Laserfiche WebLink

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e • t Editor's Note: Because some folks in St. Paul took exception in the last Watershed News & Events to my analysis of what happened during the 2004 session to the bonding bill, we have asked representatives from both parties to submit their own analysis for publication.. Here you will find commentary from both Sen. geith Langseth, Chair of the Senate Capital Investment Committee, and Sen. Cal Larson, Ranking Minority member of the committee outlining their respective positions from the 2004 session and how they see action on the bonding bill shaping up for the 2005 session. Senator Keith Langseth, Chair, Senate Capital Investment Committee Minnesota has had a long history of investing in its infrastruc- ture. We typically pass bonding bills in the even year session when we are not considering the major biennial budget. We use a guideline of 3% of the state budget as the basis for making bonding bill decisions and we have historically spent just under 3% for all the state buildings as well as parks, bridges, flood control and wetland acquisition. In the 20041egislative session I introduced a bonding bill which, once again, was just under the 3% guideline. Our Senate Capital Investment Committee spent months traveling around the state investigating the requests from state agencies and local govern- ments. The Senate Finance Committee's six Finance Divisions heard numerous bills which requested money for bonding projects and these divisions forwarded their recommendations to me for inclusion in the final bill. The bonding bill was balanced with projects in both Democratic and Republican districts. It was heard and passed in the Senate Capital Investment Committee by a 16 to 1 bipartisan vote and later was heard and passed in the Senate Finance Committee, once again, by a 16 to 3 bipartisan vote. When the bill came to the floor of the Senate ALL THE SENATE DFL SENATORS voted for the bill. Three Republicans voted for it and EVERY OTHER REPUBLICAN VOTED AGAINST THE BILL. The bonding bill needed two more Republican votes to reach the required 60% majority. There were several issues before the Legislature in the 2004 Session that the governor and his Republican Senate colleagues decided were more important than the bonding bill. "With Pawlenty's office pressing GOP senators to vote no, the bill failed to pass. In an interview last week, Pawlenty voiced no regrets for that strategy." (Quote from Minneapolis Star Tribune article by Conrad Defiebre on May 31, 2004.) The governor went on to say, "A bonding bill and nothing else is the worst-case scenario. I wasn't going to let [legislators] have dessert before they ate their vegetables." It's difficult to understand (particularly in a banding year) that funding a fix. for leaking roofs in college classrooms or an investment in flood control projects is NOT a vitally important role for the legislature or that these kinds of important items should be considered "dessert". This was a political game that the Republicans played and we ended up with NO bill in a year when needs were great, interest rates were low, and a jobs bill would have helped our economy. LEARNING FROM PAST - KEY TO 2005 BONDING BILI. By Senator Cal Larson Much has been written over the past six months regarding why the Minnesota state legislature did not approve a bonding bill. during the 2004 session. Most of the articles have been critical of one side or the other. We are fast approaching the 2005 session, however, and need to focus on results rather than blame. In order to pass a bonding bill next year, we need to learn from past mistakes. We need to cooperate rather than try to dominate. Prior to 2003, Senator Langseth and the Senate DFL leadership took a grandiose approach to the bonding bill. Utilizing the state's debt capacity to the maximum possible extent, Senate Democrats forced a vote on a massive bonding bill each year. Hundreds of projects were included in the bill, and the project sponsors were very happy. Senator Langseth's strategy was to reach conference committee with a bonding bill that provided maximum leverage in negotiating with the House of Representa- tives, who consistently brought a more fiscally conservative package to the table. Quite honestly, his strategy was effective for several years. Senator Langseth's approach, however, didn't work in 2003 and it didn't work in 2004 for two simple reasons. First, the Democrats lost their ability to dominate the Minnesota Senate as a result of the 2002 election. While in years prior, the Senate Democrats ruled by a large margin (as much as 41-26 in 2000) and basically had the votes to pass any bonding bill they put together. In 2003, the split was 35-32, Governor Pawlenty was elected to lead the state, and the dynamics in the Senate changed greatly. Second, in 2003 the era of a huge budget surplus was over. Rather than debating the amount of taxpayer rebate checks, the state legislature had to wrestle with a $4.5 billion budget deficit. Prior to 2003, there was really never any question about the state's ability to pass a large bonding bill and cover the debt service in future years. At the start of the 2004 session, Governor Pawlenty offered a $760 million banding proposal that included priority projects for education, economic development, transportation, public safety, agriculture and the environment. Given the budget deficit, the Govemor repeatedly made it clear the bonding bill must not exceed $760 million in order to cover debt service on the bonds. In response, Senator Langseth proposed. a $948 million bonding bill with no regard for the more evenly balanced Senate and no regard far paying future debt service. In fact, Senator Langseth did not release his bonding bill until two weeks before (both columns contmued on next page)