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III.LiteratureReview <br />Theliteratureregardingrentallicensingorrentalregistrationprogramsislimitedmainlytostudies <br />conductedbycitiesregardingthefeasibilityofimplementingrentallicensingprogramsintheir <br />communities.Assuch,thesestudiesgenerallyexplorerentallicensingprogramsinothercitiestolearn <br />howthosecitieshaveaddressedspecificissuesofinterest.(Gardner2008;Crichton,Rosenberg& <br />Thompson2003).Literatureonbroadertopicsofrentalregulationprimarilyfocusontheimpactofthe <br />rentregulationandlandusepoliciesonhousingmarkets.Sincethisprojectisprimarilyconcernedwith <br />propertymaintenanceaswellashealthandsafetyissuesinhousing,thisreviewwillfocusonthe <br />impactsofhabitabilitylawsandcodeenforcementonrentalmarketsandtenants.Itshouldbenoted <br />thattherelevantliteratureonthesetopicsislimitedandconsiderablydated. <br />HabitabilityLawsandCodeEnforcement <br />Thegoalofhabitabilitylawsistomaintainthehealthandsafetyofresidentsandreducethestockof <br />substandardhousing.Thereisanexpressedconcernthathabitabilitylawsand/orpropertymaintenance <br />ordinancesincreasethecostsassociatedwithowningandmanagingarentalpropertyandthatthese <br />costsareinadvertentlypassedontotenantsintheformofrentincreasesorresultintherentalproperty <br />beingabandonedaltogether(Komesar1972;Hirsch,Hirsch&Margolis1975;Hirsch&Law1979; <br />Meyers1975).Thiswouldthenmeanthatfewerrentalunitsareavailableataffordablerates.Thetwo <br />primarygoalsofhabitabilityandpropertymaintenanceregulations·w;“‘©;­z7;“·safetyandimproved <br />qualityofwšÒ­z“m‘ÞšÒŒ7seemtobecontradictory(Hirsch&Law1979;Hirsch,Hirsch&Margolis1975; <br />Miceli1992).Hirsch&Law(1979)concludethatpunitivehabitabilitylawsprovidenobenefitstotenants <br />butdoservetoreducetheexistenceofsubstandardhousing.Thisleavescitiesinaquandaryintermsof <br />implementingpoliciesthatachievebothgoalswhileminimizingtheimpactonrentalmarkets.Miceli <br />(1992)suggeststhathousingcodesthatareverystrictandstringentlyenforcedprovidelittlebenefitto <br />eitherthetenantsortothehousingstocksincetheyareusuallytoocostlyforthepropertyownerto <br />implement.Thesewouldincreasecoststothepropertyownertoomuch.Healsomentions,however, <br />thattheabsenceofregulationisequallyinefficient,sinceitgivesbothlandlordandtenantlittle <br />incentivetocarefortheproperty. <br />Kennedy(1987)introducesintotheliteraturetheconceptof{’zŒ‰z“m|rentalproperties.Milkingrefers <br />toreducingmaintenanceandrepairsofrentalpropertiestoaminimalŒ;Ý;Œ‘†Ò­·enoughtokeepthe <br />buildingoperationalandprofitable.Overtime,thisresultsinthedeteriorationofthehousingstock, <br />surroundingpropertyvalues,andneighborhoodquality.Citiescanrespondtolandlordswho{’zŒ‰| <br />propertiesbyenforcingstricterpropertymaintenancecodesandimposingfeesfornoncompliance.As <br />mentionedearlier,however,theliteraturesuggeststhatthecostsofcompliancewillbepassedontothe <br />tenant.Thisisparticularlytrueforrentalpropertiesthathavechronicandpersistentproblemsthat <br />requirelongtermrepairs.AccordingtoKennedy,{LEthecityhasapolicyofsloworotherwiselax <br />enforcement,theownerwillfindmilkingmoreattractivethanitotherwisewouldbe› œu| <br />Additionally,onceapropertyownerstartsmilkingarentalproperty,thecostofpermanent,longterm <br />repairsincreasesandthepropertyownerhasadisincentivetostopmilkingtheproperty. <br />6 <br /> <br />